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THE ETHICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF TORT
LIABILITY INSURANCE
Gary T Schwartzt
I
INTRODUCTION
Very frequently a liability insurance policy intervenes between a
court's tort judgment and the actual tort defendant. The signifi-
cance of this intervention is potentially great. Tort law often isjusti-
fied as achieving fairness in the allocation of losses.' Yet often it is
claimed that liability insurance, by removing liability from the shoul-
ders of the actual tortfeasor, frustrates tort law's fairness goals.2 In
addition, tort law is commonly commended as a deterrence meas-
ure.3 Yet insurance, by removing from the defendant the threat of
actual liability, obviously calls into question tort law's ability to
achieve deterrence. Indeed, many scholars share in the view that
tort law's deterrence objective is "severely, perhaps fatally under-
mined" by the prevalence of insurance.4
This Article consists of my effort to work out the relationship
between liability insurance and tort law's fairness and deterrence
t Professor, UCLA School of Law. This Article has profited from presentations at
faculty workshops at UCLA, USC, NYU, Stanford, and Boalt Hall. Special thanks to
Richard Craswell, Richard Epstein, Lewis Kornhauser, Mitch Polinsky, Hugh Scogen,
Ken Simons, and Matthew Spitzer.
1 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., The New Zealand Acddent Compensation Reform
(Book Review), 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 781, 791, 794, 797-98 (1981).
2 See, e.g., P.S. Atiyah, No Fault Compensation: A Question that Will Not Go Away, 54
TUL. L. REV. 271, 288 (1980); Peter Cane,Justice and Justifications for Tort Liability, 2 Ox-
FORD J. LEG. STUD. 30, 44-46 (1982); Joseph Ferreira, Jr., Promoting Safety through Insur-
ance, in SOCIAL REGULATION: STRATEGIES OR REFORM 267, 269 (Eugene Bardach &
Robert A. Kagan eds. 1982); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Rem-
edy, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 772, 790-93 (1985); Stephen B. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort
Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 558, 603 (1985); Alan 0. Sykes, Book Review, 56 U. CHI. L. REv.
1153, 1155 (1989); Paul Weiler, Legal Policy for Medical Injuries 89 (June 1987) (un-
published manuscript available from the Cornell Law Review).
3 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987).
4 John G. Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 815,823
(1967); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 239, 248 (1970); GEOFFREY
PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY 24 (1979); Richard L. Abel, Torts, in THE POLI-
TICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIquE 185, 191 (David Kairys ed. 1982); Izhak Englard,
The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27,
55 (1980); RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government
Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1298-1300 (1980); Glanville Williams, The Aims of the
Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEG. PROBS. 137, 165-68 (1951). But see Fleming, supra, at 825.
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objectives. Of course, if insurance does frustrate those objectives,
one response would be for courts to refuse to recognize the validity
of liability insurance contracts.5 Tort liability insurance seems not
to have existed in this country prior to 1886.6 During succeeding
years, however, as tort liability itself became increasingly common,
companies began offering negligence insurance policies. A short se-
ries of judicial opinions proceeded to address the question of
whether the common law should give effect to these insurance con-
tracts. The finale of this series-the Missouri Supreme Court's di-
vided opinion in Breeden v. Frankford Marine Plate Accident & Glass
Insurance Company 7-now serves as a standard citation for the con-
clusion that negligence liability insurance policies are legally
proper.8 By now, most of us take the Breeden result utterly for
granted; yet at the same time many of us persevere in complaining
that liability insurance is inconsistent with tort law's fundamental
objectives. Acknowledging this tension, this Article will consider
whether Breeden was indeed correctly decided; as the Article's analy-
sis unfolds, the positions taken by the Breeden majority and dissent
will be set forth in the margins. To the extent that this analysis con-
firms that liability insurance is acceptable, the Article will explore
the implications of this result.
In maintaining its focus on liability insurance, this Article will
largely adhere to a policy of open-mindedness or agnosticism as to
the actual objectives of tort law. That is, the Article will not profess
to determine whether the best justification for tort rules comes from
principles of fairness, from expectations of deterrence, or from
5 "At the beginning of the nineteenth century, liability insurance would have been
unthinkable. It would have been considered . .. immoral .... ." 11 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, TORTS 1-90 (Andr6 Tunc ed. 1983). See generally
Mary Coate McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Liability Insurance, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 26
(1941). Liability insurance is not tolerated in the Soviet Union, on grounds that it both
frustrates tort law's fairness goals and undermines its deterrence capacity. See Alice Erh-
Soon Tay, The Foundation of Tort Liability in a Socialist Legal System: Fault Versus Social Insur-
ance in Soviet Law, 19 U. TORONTO LJ. 1, 15 (1969).
6 An employer's liability policy in 1886 was the first liability insurance in America.
See C. ARTHUR WILLiAMS,JR., INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION 3-4 (1969). See also the chronology of policies set forth in C.A. Kuu' &JOHN W.
HALL, CASUALTY INSURANCE 20-22 (4th ed. 1969).
7 220 Mo. 327, 119 S.W. 576 (1909). The court divided 5-2 on this issue. In a
sense, however, all seven votes were dictum, as the court was unanimous on another
issue that disposed of the appeal. For the sake of convenience, this Article will refer to
the block of five judges as the "majority" and the block of two as the "dissent."
8 See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw: BASIC TEXT 287 n.7 (1971).
American courts are currendy divided as to the acceptability of liability insurance
for punitive damages. See George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 1009 (1989). For a brief discussion of the punitive damage issue, see Gary T.
Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 136-37 (1982).
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some combination of both. Within the fairness-oriented literature,
there are lively disputes as to which fairness argument makes the
most sense. No effort will be made here to arbitrate those disputes;
likewise, the Article will not profess to ascertain which particular de-
terrence analysis is the most persuasive. Rather, in adhering to its
open-minded plan, the Article will tend to accept as a given as many
of these arguments as possible, and will then evaluate the relation-
ship of each of them to the institution of liability insurance. In addi-
tion, after taking fairness and deterrence into account, the Article
will give consideration to the idea that compensating victims
through loss spreading is the social policy that tort law may be try-
ing to achieve; at this point the Article will assess how this possible
tort objective fits in with liability insurance.
The Article's conclusions can be briefly summarized. Liability
insurance is quite consistent with certain fairness rationales that
often are attributed to tort law-but quite inconsistent with others.
Liability insurance plays an essential role if loss spreading is a
proper tort objective; that it is such an objective is, however, subject
to considerable doubt. As far as deterrence is concerned, the econ-
omists are wrong: it cannot be concluded that liability insurance is
a priori efficient. Rather, the efficiency of many forms of liability
insurance depends on the balance to be struck among several fac-
tors that the Article identifies. Because these factors, at least for the
time being, do not lend themselves to empirical evaluation, the effi-
ciency of much of liability insurance is currently indeterminate.
Given the significance of liability insurance within the tort system,
this is a guarded assessment that casts doubt on the idea that this
system rests on a solid economic foundation. Indeed, my own per-
sonal (and non-agnostic) view, set forth at the very end of the Arti-
cle, is that liability insurance can be most clearly justified if tort law
is appreciated in ethical rather than merely economic terms.
II
FORMS OF INSURANCE
Even if liability insurance is regarded as posing a serious prob-
lem for tort law, an obvious point is that this insurance is by no
means comprehensive among tort defendants. 9 Many defendants
are almost wholly without insurance: i.e., they are "self-insured" (an
odd euphemism for "uninsured") 1 0 or they "go bare" (a phrase that
emphasizes the vulnerability of dispensing with insurance). As of
9 "Defendant" is used in this Article to refer not only to parties being sued in tort
but also to parties who engage or might engage in dangerous conduct that might give
rise to eventual tort suits.
10 Self-insurance often signifies that an entity has set up an insurance-like program
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1986, the Ford Motor Company had "little or no" liability insurance
coverage.II By 1988, the City of New York was wholly self-in-
sured;12 apart from a limited number of specialized policies, so were
the City of Los Angeles, i3 the County of Los Angeles, 14 and the
State of California. 15
Furthermore, even when parties do purchase liability insurance,
the policies often contain features that provide for significant ele-
ments of self-insurance. Almost every liability insurance policy writ-
ten in this country has some cap or policy limits; 16 above this cap the
defendant is without insurance. 17 Some insurance policies have a
deductible below which the defendant is not covered by insurance.18
for reserving funds and handling claims. Some entities, although self-insuring for liabil-
ity, hire an insurance company to manage the process of claims administration.
11 See Ford Tells SEC of Billions in Possible Product Liabilities, L.A. Times, May 10, 1986,
§ 6, at 1, col. 1. George Priest estimates that by 1986 at least 607o of all products liabil-
ity pay-outs were financed by self-insurance. George L. Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the
Public Understanding of Insurance, 63 TUL. L. REv. 999, 1009 (1989).
12 See Patricia Bellew Gray, City's Nemesis, Wall St.J., Mar. 16, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
13 Telephone interview with Art Cupple, Risk Manager, City of Los Angeles (June
23, 1989). The purchase of liability insurance is sometimes required by the terms of
bond issues.
14 Telephone interview with Linda Felix, Risk Management Officer, County of Los
Angeles (July 3, 1989).
15 Telephone interview with Richard Beck, Office of Insurance and Risk Manage-
ment (August 3, 1989).
The larger the number of risky episodes in which the entity engages, the more those
risks will tend to average out within the entity itself, hence rendering less necessary the
risk-pooling effects of liability insurance. It is not surprising, then, that larger organiza-
tions have a disproportionate tendency to self-insure.
16 The information on actual insurance practices in this and later paragraphs has
been derived from telephone conversations with many insurance agents and brokers.
17 The majority opinion in Breeden, apparently thinking of policy limits, emphasized
that "the indemnity provided by liability insurance is only limited and partial." 220 Mo.
at 430, 119 S.W. at 608. The dissent, however, thought that it was "self-evident" that "if
the indemnity is only partial, then to that extent the responsibility and the correspond-
ing degree of care required to be exercised are reduced to the extent of the indemnity,
whether partial or complete." Id. at 357, 119 S.W. at 583. Whether policy limits make
sense, in economic terms, as a way of encouraging care on the part of an insured is an
uncertain question. On the oddity of policy limits in first-party health insurance, see
Mark V. Pauly, Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in the Medical Economy, 24 J.
ECON. Lrr. 629, 642 (1986).
A common feature of health insurance is a continuing division of cost pursuant to a
preestablished formula (often 80%-20%). Such formulary divisions are rare in liability
insurance contracts. It is easy enough to understand why. Such an arrangement would
implicate the financial interests of both the insurer and the insured in the administration
of every dollar of every tort claim. Accordingly, there would be troublesome problems
of coordination and the resolution of possible conflicts.
18 This deductible can be written on either a per-occurrence or per-annum basis.
Likewise, policy limits, as described above, can be defined in an occurrence or an an-
nual-aggregate way.
Deductibles are less attractive in liability insurance than they are in first-party insur-
ance, such as health insurance. A first-party insurance deductible eliminates many
claims altogether, as well as the cost of processing those claims. By contrast, a liability
316 [Vol. 75:313
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Other defendants, though generally self-insured, secure the protec-
tion of an "excess" or "catastrophic" liability policy that takes effect
once losses go above some certain point. Analytically, of course, a
deductible is equivalent to an excess arrangement; pursuant to each,
the defendant is insured only once liability reaches some predeter-
mined level. Yet as a matter of the common language surrounding
insurance practices,- there is a major difference between the two:
people refer to deductibles when the predetermined level is quite
low, to excess coverage when this level seems high. Variations on
themes such as these can be seen in the practice of "retrospective
rating."1 9 Under retrospective rating, the insured pays a premium
at the beginning of the policy year. At the end of the year, the in-
sured's actual liability record is toted up, and the insured is then
either given a rebate or assessed a surcharge to take that actual rec-
ord into account; however, these rebates and surcharges may not
exceed certain predetermined amounts. In essence, retrospective
insurance is an arrangement pursuant to which the insured is in fact
bare over some substantial range of liability possibilities. 20
For defendants like Ford and New York City who are wholly or
almost wholly without insurance, there clearly is nothing in the prac-
tice of liability insurance that interferes with the achievement of
whatever tort law's goals might be. Inasmuch as such parties are
defendants in a significant proportion of all tort cases, their self-
insurance defeats the broadest statements as to how liability insur-
ance undermines those goals. Even so, insofar as judicial opinions
such as Breeden give expression to judicial understandings as to what
tort law is all about, the issues raised by liability insurance cannot be
entirely ignored even when thinking about the tort liability of these
parties. As for defendants who are partially self-insured, to observe
that they have this status is to acknowledge that they are partially
covered by insurance policies; hence the acceptability of insurance is
an issue of obvious relevance.
As this Article worries about the practice of liability insurance,
it will assume that parties are in a position to purchase insurance for
the discrete activities that they engage in. Though there are certain
insurance deductible merely diverts a claim from the insurer to the insured, who may be,
moreover, in a poorer position to process it. Moreover, if the plaintiff's total loss ex-
ceeds the deductible, the deductible serves to divide the claim between insurer and in-
sured, leading to a costly problem of coordination.
19 See C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 6, at 79-82.
20 The insured pays, however, a necessary premium (the original premium minus
the maximum rebate) to secure coverage above some necessary level (the original pre-
mium plus the maximum surcharge). Whether this level is moderately high or "cata-
strophically" high depends on which of several available retrospective plans the insured
has chosen.
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problems with this concept of "activity," 21 for most purposes it
works well enough. In light of the concept, an individual who is a
doctor might well have three liability insurance policies: one that
covers him in his role as motorist, another in his role as home-
owner, 22 and a third in his role as a medical professional.2 3 For any
particular person, the actual extent of tort liability is a consequence
of roughly five factors: the range of activities that the person
chooses to engage in, each of which has its own risky character; the
quantity (and quality) of the actual risks that the person generates as
he pursues that activity; 24 the operation of the factor of chance,
which determines which of these risks in fact materialize in injuries;
the factor of chance again, insofar as it establishes the seriousness of
those injuries; and finally, the vagaries of the litigation process, inas-
much as they determine which injuries actually result in which legal
liabilities.
In conceiving of insurance within an activity framework, this Ar-
ticle will primarily consider two polar forms of insurance.25 One is
insurance that is "completely flat": insurance whose premiums and
other terms takes no account of the level of risks created by an in-
sured as he pursues a particular activity. Completely flat insurance,
while unusual, is not unknown in the real world. For example, many
21 In reviewing insurance practices generally, a key point to appreciate is that an
insurance company will continue to develop narrower categories until the point is
reached at which the costs incurred in further subcategorization catch up with the com-
petitive benefits that the company gains by that subcategorization. This balance be-
tween costs and benefits determines the extent to which insurance premiums are
responsive to an insured's actual risktaking (as will be described below). That balance
also explains how broadly or narrowly insurers define the "activities" that they take into
account. In addition, the balance governs the extent to which insurers worry about the
"level" at which the insured engages in an activity. As far as activity levels are con-
cerned, malpractice insurance ignores the number of surgeries a doctor performs and
the number of hours he works. By contrast, the premiums for products liability insur-
ance are calculated as a predetermined percentage of dollars of sales. Such a formula
renders the premium a direct function of the number of products sold. Auto insurers
make an effort to ascertain the length of the insured's commute to work (a simple fact
that is constant in the short run), but they generally do not inquire into the insured's
actual annual mileage. The control of a defendant's "activity level" is an important
theme in modern strict liability theory. See infra text accompanying note 111.
22 In fact, the liability portions of some homeowners policies provide general liabil-
ity protection, excluding only liabilities that arise from business activities or motor vehi-
cle use. In one recent situation, a wrongful-death judgment entered against a
deerhunter who negligenly shot a local resident was covered by the hunter's homeown-
ers insurance policy. See James Howard Kunstler, A Killing in Maine, N.Y. Times, Sept.
10, 1989, § 6 (magazine), at 58, col. 1.
23 In practice, insurers charge doctors by taking their specialization into account.
See supra note 21.
24 If the defendant is operating under a rule of strict liability, all that may matter is
the quantity of his risks. If something like negligence is the liability rule, then the quality
of risks matters greatly as well.
25 In this regard, this Article follows the lead ofS. SxiAVELL, supra note 3, at 195-96.
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lines of "personal" insurance-including homeowners liability in-
surance and professional malpractice insurance-make no effort to
reflect the individual's accident potential. 26 A further example of
completely flat insurance can be found in Australia today, where
auto insurance for personal injury liability relies on a flat rate that
ignores almost all variables concerning the individual insured; no
matter how frequently a motorist is involved in drunk driving acci-
dents, his premium remains the same.2 7
The usual explanation for flat insurance practices relates to the
difficulties insurance companies face in acquiring, in a reasonable-
cost way, the information needed for the calculation of risk-respon-
sive premiums. Homeowners' insurers could inspect residential
premises and evaluate the liability risks occasioned by particular in-
sureds; but insurance companies evidently have concluded that the
cost of such an inspection program would exceed the limited value
of the information that this program would uncover. Insurers could
take into account, in fixing premiums, the past claims records of
professionals who apply for new insurance; evidently, however, the
number of past claims tends to be so low as to deprive these claims
records of predictive credibility.28 Of course, even an insurance
company that declines to adopt a sophisticated premium schedule
will, if confronted by a sufficiently high-risk insured, at some point
take this into account: for example, the company might decline to
renew the policy of a homeowner who has three dog-bite claims out-
standing against him. In light of options such as this, within private
insurance markets completely flat insurance stands as a very ex-
treme case. An extreme result is obtained in Australia-but this is
only because all auto insurance is there written by a single govern-
mental insurer, which, as a matter of politics or public policy, has
historically chosen to adopt a practice of premium uniformity which
overrides the classifications that the economics of private insurance
would otherwise suggest.2 9
The second form of insurance to be discussed in this Article is
26 The time that the doctor spends assisting the insurance carrier in preparing a
defense to a malpractice claim serves, perhaps, as an in-kind deductible. Moreover, in
medical malpractice insurance there have been very recent moves in the direction of
formal experience rating. See Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice Liability, in LiBXlE-
try: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 101, 119 & n.39 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston
1988).
27 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Advantages of Tort, in PERSONAL COMPENSATION FOR
INJURY 70, 74-75 (Australia Attorney-General's Department ed. 1984). The drunk driver
may, of course, at some point lose his driver's license.
28 That those claims often relate back to doctor behavior which took place several
years previous likewise diminishes their predictive power. For a general discussion of
experience rating in malpractice insurance, see P. Weiler, supra note 2, at 110-15.
29 See Schwartz, supra note 27.
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insurance that is "perfectly responsive": insurance whose premiums
are set so as to exactly relate to the level of risk that the insured's
own conduct occasions. There are two possible objections to the
norm of perfectly responsive insurance. First, because this insur-
ance fails to pool insureds who have different risky characteristics,
some might appraise it as not really partaking of the insurance func-
tion. This appraisal would, however, be wrong. Responsive insur-
ance remains insurance in a strong sense: while it takes full account
of the insured's actual risk level, it nevertheless fully protects the
insured against the vicissitudes of pure chance, inasmuch as it is
chance that converts original risks into actual injuries with specific
severities. Secondly, the very concept of perfectly responsive insur-
ance might strike many readers as unreal or bizarre, insofar as the
concept conjures up an image of an insurance company constantly
"observing" the behavior of the insured and then continuously ad-
justing the insurance premium.30 Certainly, on account of the costs
referred to above, no such process of observations and premium ad-
justments takes place in the real world.3 1 Nevertheless, there are
major elements of responsiveness in many insurance arrangements.
Under "schedule rating,"32 the insurance company adjusts the pre-
mium charged to an insured by taking into account the information
yielded by an inspection or survey of the insured's operations.
Schedule rating is a common feature in products liability insurance,
commercial landowner-and-occupiers' insurance, auto-fleet insur-
ance, and aviation insurance. Under "merit rating" and "experi-
ence rating," the insurance company sets its premiums by taking
into account the recent liability record of the insured, on the theory,
identified above, that the insured's previous torts have some validity
in predicting the future.33 Experience rating3 4 is a commonplace in
30 See Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELLJ. ECON. 120, 127-28 (1982).
31 The possibility of observation and monitoring also comes up in the discussion of
vicarious liability rules such as respondeat superior. Here the notion of observation
does seem meaningful, as the employer often is in a good position to observe the contin-
uing behavior of his employee.
32 Professor Abraham calls this "feature rating." KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DisTRBUtrr-
ING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 71-73 (1986).
33 Sometimes it is suggested, as an alternative to this explanation, that experience
rating is a practice that insurers engage in so as to encourage the insured to behave
nontortiously during the course of the current insurance contract (that is, so as to re-
duce moral hazard). Insurers, however, generally refuse to engage in experience rating
when the information about past claims does not seem rich enough to give it predictive
power. This refusal confirms the prediction explanation for experience rating and
seems to reject the alternative moral-hazard explanation.
34 Extremely interesting results can be produced by certain combinations of partial
self-insurance and risk-responsive insurance pricing. Consider the institutional defen-
dant that is protected only by a catastrophic policy. If, in Year X, an accident occurs that
is below the catastrophic level, the defendant pays for its liability in full. Yet the cata-
strophic insurer which engages in experience rating may inquire about the incident and
320 [Vol. 75:313
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personal auto insurance, workers' compensation insurance, and hos-
pital insurance, as well as in the other lines of insurance listed just
above.3 5
In considering the combination of schedule rating and experi-
ence rating, one obvious observation is that they merely move liabil-
ity insurance in a responsive direction. Perfectly responsive
insurance, like completely flat insurance, remains an idealization.
Almost all insurance policies lie in the vast intermediate range be-
tween the two. Even so, the two extreme forms of insurance may be
quite useful as "ideal types" in the evaluation of the impact of insur-
ance on tort law's basic objectives. That is, once the impact of these
ideal types of insurance is ascertained, it should become possible to
derive evaluations of insurance in its more typical intermediate
forms. This Article indeed relies on such an ideal-type strategy
whenever it refers to insurance that is "primarily" flat or insurance
"to the extent that" it is responsive.3 6
III
THE FAIRNESS OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
Certain introductory observations can be ventured as to the
logic of liability insurance. By virtue of the law of large numbers, an
insurer, by writing a sufficient number of policies, can all but elimi-
nate most of the risks that the threat of liability entails when that
threat is originally borne by private parties. 37 Those parties, with-
then take it into account by raising the defendant's premium for Year X + 1. Thus the
partially insured defendant can easily end up paying more than 100 percent of the liabil-
ity cost of a particular occurrence. For discussion of phenomena such as these in work-
ers' compensation insurance, see RICHARD B. VICTOR, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND
WORKPLACE SAFETY: THE NATURE OF EMPLOYER FINANCIAL INCENTIVES (1982).
35 One point worth noting about experience rating is that its immediate focus is on
the insured's past liability record rather than on his current degree of riskiness. To this
extent, experience rating is responsive to actual liability rather than to risktaking as
such. To be sure, this point should not be overstated; insurers take past liability into
account only because it seems predictive of current liability potential. Nevertheless, the
attention that experience rating pays to actual liability renders it, for certain purposes, a
quite distinctive form of responsive insurance; for example, experience rating bears a
resemblance to partial self-insurance, since under each arrangement a portion of the
cost of actual liability ends up being borne by the insured.
Obviously, insurance arrangements in which the price of insurance is perfectly re-
sponsive to the insured's actual liability would provide no insurance protection at all. In
this way, the norm of insurance that is perfectly responsive to risktaking is much more
coherent than the norm of insurance that is perfectly responsive to actual liability.
36 However, at least at two junctures, the strategy does not suffice-inasmuch as
insurance in the intermediate range turns out to exhibit characteristics that are not dis-
played by insurance at either extreme. When these junctures are reached, the Article
will depart from its general strategy in order specifically to discuss those liability policies
whose character is realistically intermediate. See infra text accompanying notes 102, 187.
37 See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE LJ.
1990]
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out insurance, are faced with the risk of being subjected to a tort
liability judgment that might be devastating or at least disruptive.
To the extent that these parties are averse to this risk, their purchase
of an insurance policy is an intelligent step. Economists generally
believe that the risk aversion implicit in an insurance policy is a rela-
tively simple matter-an easy deduction from the doctrine of the
diminishing marginal utility of money.38 My own view is that the
risk aversion that leads to liability insurance is a difficult rather than
an easy phenomenon. Here I can refer to recent psychological stud-
ies that have highlighted the curiosities and complexities of human
conduct in the face of various kinds of risks; 39 also noteworthy is
that the risk aversion commonly associated with human beings is dif-
ficult to attribute to publicly held corporations. 40 This Article will
not endeavor to explore these complications; for present purposes,
it is enough to say that if a person or firm is for any reason averse to
the risk of a substantial tort liability, that party may find it advanta-
geous to acquire an insurance policy. 4 1
Assume, then, that an applicant and an insurance company vol-
untarily choose to enter into an insurance contract. What follows
from the fact of this mutual choice? For one thing, the welfare of
each party, as perceived by each, is evidently enhanced by the insur-
1521, 1540 (1987) (emphasizing that the risks covered by insurance should be uncorre-
lated); infra note 123.
The Breeden majority strongly stated the benefits of spreading loses through liability
insurance: "[T]he diffusion of losses arising from indemnity insurance against negli-
gence.., promotes business [and] tends to make it stable .... " 220 Mo. at 430, 119
S.W. at 608.
38 See KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 200 (1970); J.
Hirschleifer & John G. Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information-An Expository
Survey, 17J. ECON. Lrr. 1375, 1382 (1979).
39 The studies suggest that people tend to prefer a guaranteed moderate gain to
the possibility of a larger gain. To this extent people seem risk-averse. See Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 342
(1984). But people also tend to prefer the possibility of a larger loss to the certainty of a
smaller loss. In this insurance-related setting, they behave in a risk-preferring manner.
See id. at 342-43. An additional point, though, is that people tend to regard the bearing
of a "cost" as less unpleasant than the suffering of a "loss." See id. at 348-49. Liability
insurance hence may serve the helpful psychological function of converting possible
"losses" into more acceptable "costs."
40 See Gary T. Schwartz, Directions in Contemporary Products Liability Scholarship, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 763, 775 (1985). David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate
Demand for Insurance, 55 J. Bus. 281 (1982), offer several explanations for that demand
that build on the assumption of the corporation's pursuit of its own self-interest. Fur-
ther explanations might focus on the personal interests of those corporate managers
who actually make the decision to buy liability insurance on behalf of the company; they
might be seeking, for example, to avoid any severe corporate setbacks that might
threaten their own job security.
41 More fully stated, it makes sense to buy insurance if the advantage in risk reduc-
tion exceeds the administrative cost or "load" of the insurance policy itself. This load is
often estimated at 25% of the premium.
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ance arrangement; accordingly, at least on first impression, the en-
forceability of that policy is economically advantageous. At the
same time, the goals of ethics are generally advanced if individuals
are allowed, in a voluntary way, to enter into contracts that they
know will be binding on them;42 there is thus an ethics of contrac-
tual choice that corresponds to the efficiency of contractual choice.
Under an easy first iteration, then, the insurance contract is desira-
ble ethically as well as economically. 43
There is, moreover, a more specific form of ethical appeal in a
contract that provides insurance protection against the prospect of
tort liability.44 Consider several persons, each of whom engage in
risky conduct that essentially is similar; assume further, that because
of the fortuities of chance, one and only one of them will end up
being subjected to a devastating tort liability.45 In light of the equal-
ity in their basic conduct, the fortuitous designation of one person
as a liability-bearer seems unfair-a violation of the principle of hor-
izontal equity.46 To be sure, the immediate explanation for this in-
dividualization of liability is that the conduct of one person alone
has turned out to be the "cause" of the plaintiff's serious injury.
But so long as this individualization of causation is merely a matter
of chance or luck47 -and so long as the person gains no actual ad-
vantage from the fact that his is the risk that turns out to result in
42 See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGA-
TION 13 (1981).
43 Indeed, many courts have justified new tort liability rules by emphasizing that the
availability of insurance enables defendants to protect themselves against the chance of
disruptive liability. See, e.g., Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269,
1273, 45 N.W.2d 151, 154 (1950) (abrogating charitable immunity); Hicks v. State, 88
N.M. 588, 590, 544 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1975) (abrogating governmental immunity), super-
seded by statute as stated in Cole v. Las Cruces, 99 N.M. 302, 657 P.2d 629 (1983).
44 According to Glanville Williams and his co-author, the fairness appeal of liability
insurance lies in its ability to protect a tortfeasor from liability that is "out of propor-
tion" to the degree of fault; absent liability insurance, a defendant who is only slightly at
fault can nevertheless be subjected to a huge liability. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS & B.A.
HEPPLE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORT 124-25 (1976). This proportionality ration-
ale for liability insurance seems underinclusive. After all, the insurer pays the claim even
when the defendant's negligence is substantial and even when the plaintiff's injury is no
more than moderate. Perhaps, however, Williams' background point is that liability in-
surance is fair because it protects a defendant against the fortuities of accident severity.
So interpreted, his argument is consistent with the analysis that follows in the text.
45 Actually, two fortuities are conflated here. The first: many parties are negligent,
but only a few injuries result. The second: of these few injuries, only one is serious.
Under my analysis, liability insurance protects against each form of fortuity.
46 SeeJohn Martin Fischer & Robert H. Ennis, Causation and Liability, 15 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 33 (1986) (discussing hypothetical described infra in text accompanying note 91);
see also Sugarman, supra note 2, at 573 n.67.
47 One recent philosophical treatment of the morality of luck is Michael J. Zimmer-
man, Luck and Moral Responsiblity, 91 ETHICS 374 (1987).
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injury4 8 -it is hardly clear that the factor of causation justifies what
would otherwise be a horizontal-equity violation.49 In any event,
whether or not the imposition of full liability (on the basis of fortui-
tous causation) is itself unfair, the law clearly promotes fairness
when it at least permits each of these individuals to protect himself
against chance by purchasing liability insurance.50
To be sure, the exact strength of this fairness claim may be de-
pendent on several variables. One is the nature of the insurance
policy. The hypothetical above, with its emphasis on the similarity
in the conduct of the several parties, is most effective when insur-
ance is perfectly responsive, so that parties who engage in equal
risktaking end up paying equal premiums. Flatly priced insurance
certainly protects parties against the ravages of risk and bad luck-
and from an ethical perspective this is no mean accomplishment.
Still, it does so in a way that lumps together parties with very differ-
ent risktaking characteristics; and this somewhat diminishes its fair-
ness appeal.51 The precise rule of liability that courts are applying
also affects the overall power of the fairness idea. If negligence is
the rule, then a party can avoid subjecting himself to the fortuities of
chance by adopting the seemingly straightforward strategy of avoid-
ing negligent conduct.52 However, when liability is based, as it fre-
quently is, on strict liability principles,53 this strategy is not
48 On this factor, see Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits:
Part II, 2 LAw & PHIL. 5, 7 (1983).
49 For further discussion on whether it is proper to regard causation as mere fortu-
ity, see infra text accompanying note 96.
Implicated here is a much-discussed question within the criminal law: should "at-
tempts" be punished less severely than completed crimes? For one analysis, see Michael
Davis, Why Attempts Deserve Less Punishment than Complete Crimes, 5 LAw & PHIL. 1 (1986).
50 This same point has recently been made in Richard A. Epstein, Luck, 6 Soc. PHIL.
& POL. 17, 29-30 (1988).
51 Indeed, given this feature, completely flat insurance runs the risk of creating a
distinct form of unfairness. Under a flat regime, insurance is offered at an equal price to
parties who may be significantly unequal in the risks they create. By treating unlike
persons alike, flat insurance apparently departs from the norm of horizontal equity. To
be sure, the low-risk person can avoid the unfairness of an average-risk premium by
declining to purchase an insurance policy. This ability to turn down insurance provides
a powerful response to any claim that flatly priced insurance is unfair. Although this is a
powerful response, in many circumstances it may not be powerful enough. If the indi-
vidual, for whatever reason, is strongly averse to the risk of liability, then the nonpur-
chase of insurance may not be a realistic choice. Moreover, when the law requires the
individual to purchase insurance, then this is not even a legally permissible choice.
On the general topic of the fairness of systems of risk classification adopted by lia-
bility insurers, see K. ABRAHAM, supra note 32, at 64-100; GulDo CALABRESI, IDEALS, BE-
LIEFS, ATrITUDES AND THE LAw 35-44 (1985).
52 On the actual complexities of this strategy, see infra text accompanying notes
151-54.
53 Frequently it is said that in contemporary tort law negligence liability is the gen-
eral rule, strict liability the exceptional situation. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Rethinking Com-
parative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 TUL. L. REv. 235,
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available: the party may not have any reasonable-cost way of avoid-
ing the conduct that gives rise to liability. Under these strict-liability
circumstances, the fairness features of liability insurance become es-
pecially prominent.
Moreover, one premise of the previous paragraph-that under
a negligence rule a party can escape liability by simply avoiding neg-
ligent conduct-deserves to be called into question. Most observers
of our existing tort system agree that it includes a very considerable
capacity for error: even if a defendant's behavior is nonnegligent in
fact, there is a significant chance that a jury will err and hold him
liable. Of course, this language of "error" assumes that there is a
right answer that the jury proceeds to get wrong. A separate problem
of "uncertainty" suggests that there frequently is no right answer at
all-in light of the vagueness that characterizes core tort concepts
such as "negligence." As a result of this uncertainty, even if the
defendant and the jury are both conscientious and competent, the
defendant cannot, by merely endeavoring to behave reasonably,
eliminate the chance that his actual conduct will eventually be found
faulty by the jury.
Accordingly, one of the "risks" that a defendant protects him-
self from by purchasing liability insurance is the risk that conduct
which he intelligently believes is nontortious will nevertheless be
designated as tortious by eventual juries, as a result of either error
or uncertainty. 54 Yet to identify this risk is to suggest another fair-
ness advantage in liability insurance. From a fairness perspective, it
certainly is deeply unfortunate that the current tort system so fre-
quently exposes a defendant to false or doubtful findings of liability.
Still, that exposure is due to the system's commitment to trial-by-
jury and a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof; and
these commitments may well entail benefits that adequately justify
the misfortunes in question. Yet even if the system's unreliability in
ascertaining liability can perhaps be tolerated as a necessary evil, for
fairness purposes there is abundant appeal in at least allowing de-
fendants voluntarily to protect themselves against that unreliability
by the purchase of liability insurance. 55
245 (1986). However, so long as the legal system includes important principles of vica-
rious liability, such a characterization is unsatisfactory. A court's opinion may present a
lawsuit against a bus company as a negligence case; in fact, however, the bus company is
liable for its driver's negligence only because of a strict liability rule of respondeat superior.
Since the bus company has limited but imperfect control of its drivers' behavior, its strict
liability is what should be emphasized here in considering the appeal of liability
insurance.
54 For a discussion of further implications of this point, see infra text accompanying
notes 143-45.
55 The previous paragraphs, insofar as they have highlighted the fairness of liability
insurance, have assumed that liability insurance is voluntarily purchased by the individ-
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There are, then, meaningful fairness advantages that liability in-
surance provides. Even so, the task remains of determining whether
insurance is sufficiently consistent with the objectives that tort liabil-
ity rules may be trying to achieve. My Article here assumes that tort
law's basic justification can be found somewhere within principles of
fairness. In an open-minded way, the Article now endeavors to
identify and distinguish between the general forms of fairness argu-
ments that might support tort liability rules; moreover, it seeks to
illustrate these forms of argument by reviewing several specific fair-
ness arguments that leading tort scholars have recently advanced.
The first form of argument to be considered here is that of re-
tributive justice. Such an argument stipulates that a defendant, be-
cause he has acted in a certain improper way, should be required to
bear the burden of liability for the resulting harm.56 Now I, along
with others,57 am doubtful that any theory of retribution can go a
long way towards explaining our current tort system. For one thing,
such a theory clearly depends on the assumption that there is some-
thing distinctively wrongful in the defendant's conduct; hence the
theory is ill-equipped to deal with tort rules of strict liability--even
ual. On occasion, however, this country's system of accident law compels the purchase
of insurance. For workers' compensation, compulsory insurance is part of the very con-
ception of the liability program; for auto accidents, legislatures have superimposed a
limited insurance obligation upon the ongoing system of common-law tort liability. In
addition, the law includes a variety of somewhat ad hoc insurance requirements. For
example, federal and state law currently subject passenger airlines to a number of liabil-
ity insurance requirements. See 14 .C.F.R. § 298.41-298.45 (1989) (federal require-
ments); ROD D. MARGO, AVIATION INSURANCE 17 (2d ed. 1989) (describing state
requirements). In California, an odd statute imposes an insurance obligation on local
school boards. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35,208 (West 1989). In several states, recent mal-
practice reform statutes include provisions requiring medical professionals to secure lia-
bility insurance coverage. See F. Townsend Hawkes, The Second Reformation: Florida
Medical Malpractice Law, 13 FLA. STATE U.L. REV. 747, 781-83 (1985). While this Article
focuses on voluntary liability insurance, it also attempts to note at what points a compul-
sion to buy insurance would affect its analysis. At the outset it can be noted that the fact
of compulsion obviously weakens the various ethical and welfare arguments in favor of
liability insurance developed above.
56 See David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CAUF. L. REV. 665,
666 (1985).
Jules Coleman, in a quasi-retributivist vein, argues that one goal of accident law
ought to be to require parties to surrender their "wrongful gains"-the gains that they
have secured through their negligent wrongdoing. See Coleman, supra note 48, at 7.
57 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 4, at 140-44; Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of
Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part 1, 1 LAw & PHIL. 371, 372-76 (1982) [hereinafter Cole-
man, Part I].
Coleman appreciates that the current tort system cannot be characterized as a sys-
tem that pursues or achieves the goal of annulling wrongful gains. See Coleman, supra
note 48, at 7. Here Coleman relies partly on the point that while the negligent wrong-
doer may benefit from his creation of a negligent risk, he does not actually profit by the
fortuitous process by which risk is converted into the plaintiff's injury. In light of this,
Coleman contends, corrective justice does not itself mandate that the defendant bear
liability for that injury. See id. at 10-11.
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the elemental rule that renders an employer automatically liable for
its employee's negligence. 58 Secondly, even when the defendant is
negligent, the retributive idea appears to require a degree of wrong-
fulness in his conduct that goes well beyond what the law frequently
characterizes as negligence. As one considers, for example, the mo-
torist who absentmindedly takes his eyes off the road, it is hard to
see how his inattention deserves the response of retribution. Fur-
thermore, retribution bears an awkward relationship to basic fea-
tures of the tort process. Given that process, a defendant is
subjected to liability if, but only if, his wrongful conduct happens to
result in injury; this emphasis on the happenstance of an actual in-
jury seems anomalous from the perspective of retribution. Also, in
a tort action the magnitude of the defendant's liability depends pri-
marily on the extent of the victim's injury in the individual case. For
purposes of retribution, this is an emphasis that seems equally
anomalous.
Yet my doubts notwithstanding, retribution has been supported
as a principal tort objective by a number of traditional tort schol-
ars. 59 Moreover, ideas of retribution play a significant role in how
the public thinks about tort,60 and perhaps even in the actual justifi-
cation of particular tort doctrines. Notions of retribution can easily
be found, for example, in the rhetoric that surrounds the collateral
source rule, and perhaps in the rule itself.61 Therefore it is certainly
worthwhile to inquire into how liability insurance relates to
whatever retributive goals tort law might harbor. This inquiry leads
to an initial observation: flatly priced insurance obviously violates
the retributive norm.62 For given such insurance, the same mone-
tary burden is borne by the wrongdoer and by the innocent (so long,
at least, as they are both engaged in the same activity). 63
An entirely different analysis, however, is invited by the practice
58 See supra note 53.
59 See, e.g., JoHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 449 (1lth ed. 1957).
Moreover, the Breeden dissent conceives of tort liability partly in retributive terms,
referring to liability as a "penalt[y]" for wrongdoing. 220 Mo. at 368, 119 S.W. at 587.
60 In an airplane-crash case that recently headed towards trial, one plaintiff made
his objective explicit: "I want [the defendants] punished." N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1989,
at A15, col. 3 (national ed.).
61 SeeJohn G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in the Law of Torts,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 1478, 1546-47 (1966).
62 Glanville Williams concludes that liability insurance "seems to be inconsistent"
with any norm of retribution. Williams, supra note 4, at 165. He does not realize that his
conclusion does not hold to the extent that insurance is responsively priced.
63 In one passage the Breeden dissent seemed to make this point: "Should a court of
justice uphold such a policy of insurance and assist the self-confessed wrongdoer, who
has wrongfully killed or injured his fellow man, to collect the policy, and thereby enable
him to escape the penalties incident to his own wrong? I think not .... " 220 Mo. at
368, 119 S.W. at 587.
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of perfectly responsive insurance. This insurance renders the extent
of the defendant's financial burden proportional to the level of im-
proper risks that his conduct occasions. 64 One point here is that
responsive insurance poses no threat to tort theories of retribution;
a stronger point is that such insurance actually enhances tort law's
ability coherently to perform the retributive function. As noted,
from the standpoint of retribution tort law behaves curiously when
it allows a defendant to be sued only when an accident occurs and
when it measures the magnitude of a defendant's liability simply by
the size of the plaintiff's injury. Responsive insurance eliminates
these curiosities. The effective burden borne by the insured be-
comes a function of his risktaking rather than the fortuities of what
accidents happen; and the extent of that burden becomes a function
of average expected injury, rather than the fortuitous injury that a
particular victim turns out to suffer.
A second form of argument in possible support of tort liability
rules-call it compensatory justice-relates to the reparation of acci-
dent victims. 65 The essence of such an argument is that the defend-
ant-having been involved in a certain way in the infliction of the
plaintiff's injury66-is under an obligation to make sure that the
plaintiff receives compensation for that injury. To whatever extent
our tort regime builds on the premise of compensatory justice, lia-
bility insurance fares just fine.6 7 In either responsive or flat forms,
insurance not only is consistent with the compensatory-justice
norm, but actually serves to further that norm. Admittedly, so long
as the defendant's legal liability in the individual case is not in ex-
cess of his reachable assets, the insurance company's payment to the
plaintiff merely replaces the payment that the plaintiff would have
otherwise received from the defendant. Whenever, however, the
tort judgment is for an amount greater than the defendant's wealth,
the victim ends up more fully compensated on account of insurance
than he otherwise would have been. Now consider potential de-
fendants, such as inner-city motorists, who may be solvent enough
to be able to afford an annual insurance premium, yet not so wealthy
as to be able to bear a large tort liability. In these circumstances,
statutes that actually require the purchase of auto liability insurance
64 Coleman, Part I, supra note 57, at 375-76, rejects a retributive view of tort law on
grounds that tort imposes liability on defendants in ways that are out of line with their
individual degrees of fault. He fails to see how responsive liability insurance could in
fact achieve the kind of "at fault pool" that retributive reasoning seems to require.
65 Williams labels this "ethical compensation." Williams, supra note 4, at 141.
66 This sentence is drafted so as to leave open the question of whether the idea of
compensatory justice requires negligence on the part of the defendant or is satisfied
instead by a showing of causation alone. For various answers to this question, see infra
text accompanying notes 71-74, 76.
67 See Williams, supra note 4, at 141, 165.
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may reveal a legislative attempt to effectuate the principle of com-
pensatory justice by preventing motorists from relying on their lim-
ited solvency in order to evade their compensation obligation. 68
Moreover, the capacity of liability insurance to further the ob-
jective of compensatory justice extends far beyond the motorist who
operates under a limited insurance mandate. Consider the subur-
ban motorist with $50,000 in wealth who voluntarily buys a $50,000
insurance policy, yet whose liability for negligent motoring might
easily run to $100,000; consider also the doctor with $500,000 in
assets but who, in the absence of a $2,000,000 liability policy, would
be unable to meet more than a portion of a $1,500,000 malpractice
judgment; consider, as well, the corporate defendant whose assets,
though very substantial, might not be ample enough to pay for the
cost of a mass tort disaster-an airplane crash, for example, or a
hotel fire. In all these situations, the defendants' purchase of liabil-
ity insurance assures more complete compensation for the victims of
the defendants' torts and hence furthers the objective of compensa-
tory justice. To be sure, in each situation the fact that the defend-
ant's wealth is less than his potential liability gives him a partial de
facto immunity from tort liability of the sort that could possibly dis-
courage him from buying liability insurance. Nevertheless, such a
defendant might be horrified by the prospect of descending into in-
solvency, or of otherwise incurring a sharp downward change in
economic status. Because he might well place a high value on the
basic wealth that provides a buffer against insolvency or such a
change in status, his motives for voluntarily purchasing liability in-
surance might be especially strong.69
This favorable evaluation of the relationship of liability insur-
ance to the principle of compensatory justice leads to the question
whether it is plausible to believe that tort liability rules do (or
should) appreciably depend on this principle. A previous article of
mine considered the negligence liability rule that looms large in our
existing torts regime.70 In tending to justify that rule, the article
suggested that "ethically regarded, the idea of liability for harm
caused by one's unexcused errors and mistakes is both straightfor-
68 On the other hand, compulsory insurance raises problems of possible unfairness
to defendants. See supra note 51.
For another possible interpretation of compulsory auto insurance, see infra note
200.
69 For a previous treatment of the incentive effects of the disutility 5f bankruptcy,
see Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 563, 567 n.9 (1988).
70 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA.
L. REV. 963 (1981).
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ward and intuitive." 71 As the spokesman for this intuition, I am in
an acceptable position to consider its implications; and my own un-
derstanding is that compensatory justice is the form of argument on
which the intuition draws. 72 As far as strict liability is concerned,
Robert Keeton in a 1959 article explored certain categories of
otherwise non-negligent conduct in which the common law, sup-
ported by the ethical sense of the community, disapproves of the
defendant if he fails to make "reasonable provision for compensa-
tion of losses." 73 This explanation for existing strict liability obvi-
ously sounds in compensatory justice, and Keeton is explicit that a
liability insurance policy is a suitable way for a defendant to dis-
charge the obligation that his analysis affirms.74
Compensatory justice also invites a review of the normative tort
theory espoused by Richard Epstein. 75 His position is that, at least
in a significant number of cases, the imposition of liability need not
71 Id. at 1003. For a somewhat similar endorsement of strict liability, see id, at
1003-04.
72 It might be argued that the collateral source rule is out of line with the idea of
compensatory justice. But there are any number ofjustifications for that rule, many of
which (for example, the likelihood of reimbursement arrangements between plaintiffs
and health insurers that reduce the actual cost of health insurance) seem sufficiendy
consistent with that idea.
73 Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 22 HARV. L. REv. 401, 426
(1959). Keeton is clear that he is here concerned with interpersonal fairness and not
social loss-spreading. See id. at 443-44.
74 See id. at 420.
75 At this point Jules Coleman also deserves consideration; but since he is no more
than half-hearted in his support of a tort system, his position can be dealt with in a
footnote. In Coleman's view, a loss suffered by a plaintiff is a "wrongful loss" if it results
from conduct by the defendant that contains some element of impropriety. Coleman,
supra note 48, at 7. Accordingly, one primary goal of accident law should be restitution
for those who have been subjected to such wrongful losses. Id. at 6. The essential role
that Coleman assigns to restitution clearly aligns him with a compensatory justice under-
standing of tort law, and to this extent might render him enthusiastic about liability
insurance, which better enables the defendant to provide the compensation in question.
To be sure, Coleman's view, more fully stated, is that an enlightened accident law
should strive both to compensate wrongful losses and to annul wrongful gains. While
tort rules properly honor the plaintiff's "claim to repair," id. at 9, those rules work awk-
wardly with respect to expunging wrongful gains; hence Coleman was originally led to
all but abandon tort law as a proper device for affording compensation. See supra note 57
and accompanying text. However, in his most recent work, Coleman has taken the posi-
tion that since the defendant's negligence is "analytically connected" to the plaintiff's
injury, a regime of defendant liability may be "administrative[ly] efficien[t]" as a tech-
nique for financing a system that reimburses plaintiffs for their wrongful losses. SeeJules
L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE LJ. 1233, 1250 (1988). This position at
least approaches what is referred to here as compensatory justice, and hence seems
quite supportive of liability insurance. On the other hand, in 1987 Coleman had relied
on the factor of "deterrence" tojustify the liability of tort defendants. Jules L. Coleman,
Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to Compensate, 63 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 451, 465 (1987).
This reliance meant that his support of the tort system then depended on a certain com-
bination of ethics and economics; hence he would have needed to worry about the possi-
ble inefficiency of liability insurance.
330 [Vol. 75:313
TORT LIABILITY INSURANCE
be dependent on negligence; rather, liability is appropriate when-
ever the defendant's conduct has dearly caused the plaintiff to suffer
harm.7 6 In explaining his views, Epstein emphasizes his own "pre-
occupation" with "compensation" for the plaintiff,77 a preoccupa-
tion that begins to align Epstein's theory with the ethic of
compensatory justice. According to Epstein, if an actor, in the
course of promoting his own advantage, happens to inflict damage
on his own property, he of course bears the burden of that damage;
just because in another situation the property damaged by the ac-
tor's conduct belongs to another, the actor should not escape the
consequences. 78 This is a rationale for causation-based liability that
casts clear light on the acceptability of insurance. 79 Insofar as inju-
ries to one's own person or property are concerned, under contem-
porary law individuals dearly are free to protect themselves by the
purchase of first-party insurance policies: health insurance, disabil-
ity insurance, collision insurance, fire insurance, and so on.80 Given
Epstein's idea that "the defendant should be required to treat the
harms which he has inflicted upon another as though they were in-
flicted upon himself" 8' and in light of that actor's undoubted ability
to protect his own property through first-party insurance, the Ep-
stein tort theory dearly implies that the actor's purchase of a liability
insurance policy is unobjectionable.
Up until now, my discussion has dealt with retributive justice
and compensatory justice. A third possible form of argument-here
called corrective justice 2 -would in a way include elements of each.
76 See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 160
(1973).
77 Richard A. Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8J. LEGAL
STUD. 477, 488 (1979).
78 See Epstein, supra note 76, at 158; for the same point, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS 40-41 (1985).
79 Another Epstein rationale is that common-law rules should incorporate a com-
mon-sense, ordinary-language ethics-and that ordinary language calls for strict liabil-
ity. See Epstein, supra note 76, at 151. While this rationale may not be especially helpful
in thinking about liability insurance, it certainly can be noted that ordinary public opin-
ion hardly seems hostile to the availability of liability insurance.
80 Early American law cast doubt on the legality of first-party insurance policies that
protected the insured against the consequences of his own negligence. See Boatwright v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 32 S.C.L. (1 Strob.) 281, 286-87; MORTONJ. HoRwrrz, THE TRA.NSrOR-
MAT1ON OF AMERICAN LAW 228-31 (1977). These doubts have long since been dispelled.
Id.
81 Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391, 398 (1975).
82 Notice that this phrase here is used in much less than its full Aristotelian sense.
Aristotle recognized a fundamental distinction between "what is just in distribution"
and "what is just in correction." ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN EmIcs 142, 145 (J.E.C.
Welldon ed. 1892). All of the fairness forms of argument considered in this Section lie
on the corrective justice side of the Aristotelian divide. (On the corrective justice fea-
tures of retribution, see HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 34 (1976)).
Though Aristotle identifies and provides some discussion of the corrective justice alter-
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Corrective justice begins with the perception that it is only the com-
bination of the defendant's tortious conduct and the plaintiff's in-
jury that properly gives rise to tort liability. Building on this
perception, corrective justice-like compensatory justice in this re-
gard-concerns itself with compensation for the victim; but correc-
tive justice-in this respect somewhat resembling retributive
justice-emphasizes that the tort defendant, having created risks in
a certain way, should serve as the actual source of the compensation
payment.8 3 Accordingly, from a corrective justice perspective flatly
priced liability insurance undermines one of the two essential pur-
poses of tort liability inasmuch as it places the burden of liability on
all persons who engage in an activity, whether or not they conduct
themselves in tortious ways.
Corrective justice provides a basis for considering the tort the-
ory set forth by George Fletcher. That theory asserts that the
proper ground for liability is the nonreciprocal risk imposed on the
plaintiff by the defendant.8 4  In Fletcher's view, victims of
nonreciprocal risktaking have a right to compensation; this right sig-
nifies that even if a program of social insurance were to replace all of
tort law, within that program the claims of such victims should enjoy
the highest priority.8 5 To the extent that Fletcher's theory rests on
his sense of certain victims' entitlement to reparation, that theory
includes a compensatory-justice feature that implies the acceptabil-
ity of liability insurance. Fletcher's theory, however, also espouses
the corrective-justice propriety of imposing liability on the party
who engages in nonreciprocal risktaking. For Fletcher's purposes,
the mere act of driving does not occasion nonreciprocal risks; yet an
element of nonreciprocity is introduced when the driving is done in
a negligent manner.8 6 Flatly priced auto insurance, by allocating
native, his account leaves open many questions. See Richard A. Posner, The Concept of
Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1981). In consider-
ing the overall Aristotelian concept, I have been able above to identify and sort out the
two forms ofjustice arguments that respectively deal with retribution and compensation.
Yet there is a third form of argument that likewise can be drawn from the Aristotelian
concept; and for this argument the language of "corrective justice" seems properly evo-
cative. It is in ,this limited sense, then, that the corrective justice term will be employed
in the remainder of this Article.
83 In a sense, corrective justice incorporates compensatory justice but then compli-
cates it by imposing an additional requirement. It cannot quite be said, though, that
corrective justice subsumes retributive justice, since the reason given by corrective jus-
tice for imposing liability on the defendant is somewhat distinct from the reason of retri-
bution. Accordingly, certain features of the tort system that disturb the retributive
analyst would not pose problems for the corrective justice analyst.
84 George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543
(1972). For a discussion of Fletcher and Epstein, see Schwartz, supra note 70, at 977-
1005.
85 See Fletcher, supra note 84, at 553-54.
86 See id.
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costs equally among all motorists regardless of the incidence of
their negligence, would hence frustrate a vital half of what Fletcher
wants tort law to achieve.8 7 By contrast, responsively priced insur-
ance avoids this frustration. Under this insurance, negligent motor-
ists contribute assets to a pool of funds, which is then utilized to
compensate victims of negligent motoring; for Fletcher's purposes,
this would be a commendable result.
Fletcher's own version of corrective justice thus appears sympa-
thetic to perfectly responsive liability insurance. Yet the corrective
justice approach is capable of being asserted in an even more dra-
matic manner. According to Ernest Weinrib, what is essential for
corrective justice is that the defendant's negligence be the actual
cause of the injury which the plaintiff suffers.88 Only through such
causation are the defendant and the plaintiff "linked as doer and
sufferer of the same harm;"8 9 and only that linkage, in Weinrib's
view, puts tort law in a position to achieve corrective justice.
Weinrib gives examples of results that his corrective justice ap-
proach would rule out. Assume that A negligently injures X and that
B negligently injures Y; in Weinrib's view, there would be no justice
if (for some reason) X were allowed to recover from B and Y were
allowed to recover from A. 90 Similarly, Weinrib considers a modifi-
cation of Summers v. Tice91 in which the court knows with certainty
which of the two hunters fired the bullet that landed in the plaintiff's
eye. Here, even though each hunter's negligence was equally di-
rected at the plaintiff, because only one hunter's negligence actually
caused the plaintiff's harm, Weinrib insists that individual liability is
appropriate and shared liability wholly unjustified.92 In a recent ar-
ticle, Steven Smith, while not acknowledging Weinrib, adopts a po-
87 For Fletcher, the general activity of operating trucks would probably be regarded
as merely a part of the reciprocal risktaking involved in motoring generally; however, the
special activity of trucking gasoline would probably count for Fletcher as a nonreciprocal
risk. Fletcher would care greatly, therefore, about whether companies that provide lia-
bility insurance for truckers break out a special rate for trucking gasoline. On the ques-
tion of how narrowly "activities" are defined in liability insurance, see supra note 21.
88 ErnestJ. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CH.-KENT L. REv. 407 (1987).
89 Id. at 415.
90 Id. at 429; see also ErnestJ. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAw
& PHIL. 37, 39 (1983). The example seems quite weak, since Weinrib provides no expla-
nation as to why the law might seek to depart from the more conventional lawsuits of X
versus A and Y versus B.
91 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). The modification was first developed byJudith
Jarvis Thompson, in Remarks on Causation and Liability, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AYF. 101, 104-05
(1984).
92 See Weinrib, supra note 88, at 412-16. On account of an absence of causation,
Weinrib now opposes any recognition of affirmative duties in tort. See ErnestJ. Weinrib,
Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U.L. REv. 485, 516-17 (1989). Weinrib evidently ap-
proves of Summers v. Tice, but only by emphasizing that its holding does no more than
shift the burden of proof on the causation issue. Id. at 10-11 n.25.
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sition towards liability that considerably resembles Weinrib's. 93 For
Smith, the function of tort law is to resolve disputes that arise be-
tween parties in a manner that affirms society's basic norms. What
enables tort law to resolve such a dispute is its ability to secure vin-
dication for the plaintiff who has been injured on account of the
defendant's violation of an appropriate norm.94 And for purposes
of achieving vindication, the compensation awarded to the plaintiff
needs to come from the defendant himself, rather than from some
third party or some public compensation program. "It seems as
though receiving the compensation from the harmdoer is necessary to
produce [the victim's sense of satisfaction]. "95
Under the strong version of corrective justice adopted by
Weinrib and Smith, flatly priced insurance clearly is unacceptable.
Moreover, from their vantage points even perfectly responsive in-
surance would be an extremely doubtful practice: for that insurance
entails a sharing of liability that in their view should rest on the
harm-causer alone. This section has previously suggested that lia-
bility insurance promotes fairness by protecting the defendant
against the vicissitudes and fortuities of risk. From the perspective
of Weinrib and Smith, the identity of the harm-causer is not a fortu-
ity at all; it rather is an essential ingredient in the formulation of a
proper corrective justice remedy.96
As it happens, Weinrib seems never to have discussed the spe-
cific question of liability insurance within a corrective justice tort re-
gime, except for his single observation that "liability is
antecedent to the operation of... insurance. ' 97 Smith does include
an explicit discussion of liability insurance, and its implications are
noteworthy. What he suggests is that fairness is adequately secured
by "a finding of tortious conduct and the imposition of some sanction
against the defendant, coupled with full compensation by the de-
fendant's insurance carrier."98 Moreover, "an increase in the de-
fendant's insurance rates might constitute a sufficient sanction." 99
93 See Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Criis": A Reassessment of Current Conceptions
of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765 (1987).
94 "Vindication" is my word, but it seems to best express the idea that Smith is
driving at. See id. at 778-85. For another discussion of vindication as a tort objective, see
PETER CANE, ATIYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION & THE LAw 486-88 (4th ed. 1987).
95 See Smith, supra note 93, at 784 (quoting Andre de Carufel, Victims' Satisfaction
with Compensation: Effects of Initial Disadvantage and Third Party Intervention, 11 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 445, 452 (1981)) (emphasis in Smith).
96 But see infra note 104.
97 ErnestJ. Weinrib, The InsuranceJustification and Private Law, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 681,
683 (1985). Weinrib strongly opposes the insurance-oriented loss-spreading rationale
for tort law. See id. at 683-85.
98 Smith, supra note 93, at 795-96.
99 Id. at 796 n.112.
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By not requiring that all of the plaintiff's compensation come from
the pockets of the defendant, Smith here withdraws from the strong
version of corrective justice that he has previously staked out, so as
to enable him to acknowledge the advantages of liability insurance.
By accepting that full compensation can properly come from an in-
surer contracted for by the defendant, he is utilizing the central idea
of compensatory justice. 100 By suggesting an additional require-
ment that the defendant bear some significant burden on account of
the accident by way of an increased premium, Smith is reintroducing
at least a moderate requirement of corrective justice as a supple-
ment to compensatory justice. Since, in the real world, liability in-
surance usually is moderately or at least nontrivially responsive,' 0 '
Smith's rationale for tort liability may be well suited for the task of
justifying current tort arrangements.10 2
In any event, having by now canvassed several justice possibili-
ties, I can now wrap up this section of the Article. In considering
the question whether liability insurance complies with tort law's jus-
tice-dispensing function, the answer is that it all depends-it de-
pends on which form of argument the justice analyst has in mind,
and it depends as well on the extent to which the insurance in ques-
tion is flatly or responsively priced. In all, there is an impressive
range of possible outcomes as to the appropriateness of insurance
in light of fairness criteria. Accordingly, the many scholars who un-
qualifiedly assert that liability insurance is inconsistent with fairness
theories of tort law'0 3 are guilty of ignoring, for example, the possi-
bility that compensatory justice is the theory that tort law has in
mind-a theory that renders liability insurance not only acceptable
but commendable. Those scholars also fail to realize the way in
which responsive insurance pricing would make sense of retributive-
justice theories and certain versions of corrective-justice theories as
well; they likewise neglect the point that moderately responsive in-
surance can receive justification from a certain combination of com-
100 Having earlier critiqued the relevance of the compensation goal to tort law, id. at
768-72, at this point in his argument Smith acknowledges the significance of compensa-
tion. Id at 795.
1Ol Observe that Smith seems to be assuming insurance arrangements that are mod-
erately responsive to actual liability and not just to ex ante risktaking. Thus experience
rating would satisfy Smith, but schedule rating might not. Smith may be somewhat un-
clear as to exactly how responsive liability insurance needs to be in order to comply with
his requirement of a "sufficient sanction." Consider a $100,000 accident that results in
a motorist's premiums being increased by $150 for each of three years. This $450 obli-
gation is less than .57o of the plaintiff's entitlement. Nevertheless, it is hardly a token
increase as far as the motorist is concerned.
102 In this respect it provides one indication of the insufficiency of the bipolar ideal-
type strategy on which the Article generally relies.
103 See supra note 2.
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pensatory justice and a moderate measure of corrective justice.
Nevertheless, liability insurance, regardless of how it is priced, does
seem inconsistent with the strong corrective justice theory advanced
by a scholar such as Weinrib. °4
In short, the impact of liability insurance on tort law's possible
fairness objectives is a question that calls for a rather complex an-
swer. How, then, does liability insurance relate to tort law when the
latter is looked at from the perspective of the goal of efficient deter-
rence? This is the question considered in Section IV.
IV
LIABILITY INSURANCE AND DETERRENCE
Before discussing how deterrence theory works, it is useful to
clarify the benefits that liability insurance, considered from an eco-
nomic perspective, confers.10 5 The primary benefit, of course, con-
cerns the ability of insurance to enable parties to avoid unwanted
risks. 10 6 A secondary benefit relates to the way in which an insur-
ance policya-by including coverage for defense costs-eliminates
the burden that a defendant would otherwise bear in attempting to
review or monitor the performance of the lawyer he would need to
hire if he were uninsured. 10 7 That lawyer, through slack or the press
of other business, might tend not to work hard enough or long
enough on the defendant's case; alternatively, the lawyer, remuner-
ated by an hourly fee, might be inclined to overprepare the case, to
"milk the file." These are distinctly disadvantageous possibilities
that the defendant can avoid by acquiring a liability insurance pol-
icy, which combines the burden of defense and the burden of liabil-
ity within a single specialized entity. 08
104 One of the protections afforded by liability insurance-the protection against the
risk of fortuitous causation-Weinrib would not regard as an advantage at all. See supra
text accompanying note 96. Still, Weinrib might well appreciate liability insurance inso-
far as it protects an individual against the prospect of error and uncertainty in the appli-
cation of tort standards. See supra text accompanying note 55. It is unclear to what
extent this factor would incline Weinrib to modify the anti-insurance import of his
strong corrective justice position.
105 To be sure, liability insurance is responsible for certain diseconomies as well.
For example, all American policies include some cap on coverage. See supra text accom-
panying note 16. When there is a plausible claim for an amount in excess of that cap,
defending against the total claim will place a costly burden of coordination on the in-
surer and the insured. See supra note 18. For a treatment of the liability implications of
imperfect coordination, see Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58
Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
106 See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
107 For a related point, see PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 127 (1985).
108 The benefit that liability insurance affords the defendant in relieving him of con-
cern about his lawyer's effort can be compared to the somewhat similar benefit that the
contingent fee bestows on the plaintiff.
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If liability insurance thus facilitates these economic benefits,
what are its detrimental effects on tort law's economically-minded
deterrence goals? The economists' analysis of how tort liability
rules might achieve efficient deterrence has been prominent in the
tort literature during the last twenty years, and can easily be illus-
trated. Assume that a safety precaution would cost a defendant
$700 but would eliminate a risk whose magnitude is $1000 (for ex-
ample, a one percent chance of a $100,000 injury). Under the negli-
gence standard, as elaborated by Learned Hand, 09 the threat of tort
liability gives defendants an incentive to avoid negligence-that is,
to adopt such precautions the cost of which is less than the magni-
tude of the risk that the precaution would eliminate. 110 If a rule of
strict liability applies, then defendants of course retain the incentive
to adopt all reasonable-cost precautions. Furthermore, under strict
liability defendants have incentives to avoid risky activities, to moni-
tor and control the level of the risky activities they do engage in,"'I
and to undertake appropriate projects in safety research-and-devel-
opment."12 Here the objective is for defendants to engage in activi-
ties and undertake R & D in a reasonable-cost way; if strict liability is
needed, it is because of the likelihood that judges will regard such
questions as the reasonableness of an entire activity as beyond the
judicial function."13
Given these standard explanations of liability-rule deterrence, it
is easy to see that perfectly responsive insurance poses no problem.
Covered by such insurance, a party who engages in a certain activity
and who declines to adopt the safety precaution will encounter a
high premium. Since he can reduce this premium by $1000 by
purchasing a $700 safety precaution, he has a full incentive to make
that purchase; tort law's deterrence objectives are hence pre-
served." 14 Indeed, in one way liability rules combined with such in-
109 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
110 The Breeden dissent embraced the economic view of negligence liability. Absent
such a liability rule, the self-interest of a defendant "would dominate [him] and induce
him to adopt the mode most profitable to himself, even though that mode should be
more hazardous to the life and limb of [a potential victim]." 220 Mo. at 363, 119 S.W. at
585. For the views of the Breeden majority, see infra note 116.
111 See S. SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 21-26. See generally W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra
note 3, at 64-73.
112 See Guido Calabresi &John T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts,
81 YALE LJ. 1055, 1063 (1972).
113 See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 70-71.
114 His situation closely resembles that of the uninsured defendant, who, by incur-
ring a safety expense of $700, can avoid a liability whose expected value is $1000 (a one
percent chance of a $100,000 liability). These two situations differ only insofar as the
latter calls into play the defendant's attitude towards risk. A risk-preferring defendant
might well choose to face a one percent chance of a $100,000 liability rather than to
incur a $700 safety expenditure. The defendant who is a risk preferrer, however, would
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surance might produce even better safety results than liability rules
standing on their own: for a liability insurer may be able to offer
safety advice to an insured that will permit the latter actually to im-
prove the level of safety it provides. The logic of this possibility will
be dealt with more fully below. 1 5
Flatly priced insurance, however, poses an obvious threat to the
tort objective of inducing proper precautions. The defendant who
buys such an insurance policy may have no incentive to adopt the
$700 precaution, since any liability averted by doing so falls on the
insurer rather than on the insured himself.1 6 Possibilities like this
are well known to economists, who have long discussed the general
phenomenon of "moral hazard";" 7 their point is that an insurance
policy can release the insured from cost constraints in a way that
affects how he arranges his conduct. 118
be strongly inclined not to buy liability insurance in the first place; therefore, the ques-
tion of how such insurance would alter his behavior effectively washes out. If the de-
fendant is either risk neutral or risk averse, then in the absence of insurance he would
certainly be willing to incur a $700 safety expenditure in order to avoid a $1000 liability
risk. In addition, without insurance the risk-averse defendant, at least if he is operating
under a rule of strict liability, might seriously consider incurring even a $1300 safety
expenditure in order to avoid the one percent prospect of a $100,000 liability. Apart
from the defendant's risk aversion, however, this is an expenditure that does not make
social sense; accordingly, a liability insurance policy that enables him to avoid this risk
seems socially advantageous. For a similar analysis, see S. SHAvELL, supra note 3, at 211.
115 See infra text accompanying notes 185-90.
116 This, indeed, was the primary objection to liability insurance advanced by the
Breeden dissent. Liability insurance "has a direct and potent influence in encouraging
negligence." 220 Mo. at 351, 119 S.W. at 581. Because of liability insurance, "the pecu-
niary consideration and incentive which prompts and induces [the defendant] to exer-
cise due care is removed and destroyed." Id. at 363, 119 S.W. at 586. The Breeden
majority, however, adopted a quite different position. According to the majority, "A
predisposition to ... neglect or any form of wrong is never presumed by the law." Id. at
433, 119 S.W. at 609 (emphasis in original). Judges therefore should not assume that
"indemnity against losses by negligence will, in and of itself, induce [a defendant] to
omit the highest degree of care." Id. at 430, 119 S.W. at 608. "[T]he existence of an
indemnity fund does not directly or necessarily cause [a defendant] to relax his care and
diligence .... Id. at 429-430, 119 S.W. at 608.
Whether or not the result reached by the Breeden majority in affirming the legality of
liability insurance is economically correct, the reasoning which the majority employed en-
tails a rejection of economic norms.
117 The concept was already familiar in the literature by 1921. See FRANK H. KNIGHT,
RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PRoFrr 249, 251 (1921).
"Moral hazard" is sometimes distinguished from "morale hazard," the former re-
ferring to deliberate acts like arson, the latter to the mere relaxation of the defendant's
discipline of carefulness. See C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS & RICHARD M. HEINS, RISK MANAGE-
MENT AND INSURANCE 217 (4th ed. 1981). In this article, "moral hazard" includes each of
these possibilities.
118 Much of the economic discussion of moral hazard has taken place in the setting
of first-party insurance. In this setting, the real-world significance of moral hazard is
easy to demonstrate. For example, patients who are covered by health insurance poli-
cies providing 100% reimbursement consume a far higher volume of medical services
than do patients whose insurance policies include a substantial cost-sharing provision.
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Before considering the extent to which moral hazard may im-
pugn the efficiency of completely flat insurance,' 19 we need to worry
about the very availability of that insurance in light of a proof re-
cently developed by Professor Shavell. 120 Call this Shavell's First
Insurance Proof, which has been acceded to by Judge Posner121 and
Professor Polinsky. t 22 Consider a negligence liability rule and re-
turn to the $1000 risk that the defendant can eliminate through a
$700 safety expenditure. If the defendant has a completely flat in-
surance policy, it would seem that moral hazard evidently would in-
duce him to forego that expenditure and allow the risk to
materialize. However, this is defendant behavior that an intelligent
insurer would be in a good position to predict. Therefore, $1000 is
the minimum premium that an insurer would set: that is, the pre-
mium would include a substantial moral-hazard surcharge. If the
SeeJoseph P. Newhouse, William G. Manning, et al., Some Interim Results from a Controlled
Trial in Health Insurance, 305 NEw ENGLAND J. MEDICINE 1501 (1981). Moral hazard
reached the sports world in 1981, when a Lloyd's of London policy insuring baseball
owners in the event of a strike evidently encouraged those owners to adopt bargaining
policies that greatly increased the likelihood of a strike.
In Japan, a golfer who shoots a hole-in-one is subjected-not by law, but rather by
social custom-to an obligation or "liability" to host lavish celebrations for friends and
business associates. Many golfers in recent years have purchased liability insurance to
protect them against the burden of this entertaining obligation. Yet with such insurance
policies in place, some golfers have colluded with their caddies to create the false im-
pression of holes-in-one-thereby entitling themselves to elaborate entertainment at the
insurer's expense. See E.S. Browning, A Stroke of Luck is Bad News in Japan if One Isn't
Insured, Wall St.J., Aug. 12, 1985, at 1, col. 4. Insurers now are considering withdrawing
from this market. Id
119 The text here accepts the economists' basic assumptions as to the deterrence
efficacy of tort liability rules. However, many scholars, relying on a range of what they
regard as realistic observations, contend that tort law is all but useless as a technique for
deterrence. See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 2, at 559-90; see also William H. Rodgers,
Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 So. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1980)
and Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CALIF. L.
REv. 677 (1985) (both contending that tort law is ineffective in deterring the misconduct
of private individuals). The relevance of these realist critiques of deterrence theory to
an efficiency analysis of flatly priced insurance is both obvious and ironic. On the obvi-
ous side, if tort law, even with insurance absent, fails to deter, then there is no actual
deterrence that the introduction of insurance might undermine. With no losses to bal-
ance against the gains that insurance occasions, the efficiency of insurance becomes easy
to affirm. Yet ironically, this argument provides support for the efficiency of flatly priced
insurance only by rejecting the efficiency rationale originally offered in support of tort
liability rules.
Other analysts might conclude that tort law, in the absence of insurance, achieves
something quite significant by way of deterrence-but that its deterrence success is still
much less systematic than that implied by standard economic accounts. This intermedi-
ate appraisal of the potential for deterrence would lead to an intermediate concern for
the moral-hazard implications of flatly price insurance.
120 See S. SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 211-12.
121 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 187 (3d ed. 1986).
122 See A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 70-73 (2d ed.
1989).
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defendant ponders not buying such an insurance policy, he will real-
ize that he can defeat the prospect of liability by incurring an ex-
pense of only $700. That is, it is cheaper for the defendant to
protect himself against liability by avoiding negligence than by
purchasing liability insurance. Accordingly, a defendant will decline
to make that purchase and will instead abstain from negligent con-
duct.1 2 3 A corresponding analysis applies to the situation of the de-
fendant who is offered a responsively priced insurance policy to
cover the risk of negligence liability. If such a defendant buys the
policy and then fails to incur the $700 expenditure, the price of in-
surance will rise by $1,000. The prospect of this, however, will in-
duce the defendant to act non-negligently: that is, to incur the $700
cost. But so long as he decides to adhere to non-negligent prac-
tices, he has no need to buy the insurance policy, and hence will
decline to do so.
In one important way the inhibition on insurance availability
that Shavell identifies seems even more dramatic than his Proof sug-
gests. That Proof assumes that the insurance policy applies to a de-
fendant's course of conduct that runs the risk of a single injury. 124
If there is only one such threatened injury, then the liability insurer
is at least able to calculate an appropriate premium that takes the
prospect of moral hazard into account (though the premium may be
higher than anything the defendant is willing to pay). Most insur-
ance policies, however, cover all injuries that occur in the course of
a particular duration, usually one year. Whatever the number of
such injuries might annually be in the absence of insurance, once a
liability policy is in place its moral-hazard care-reducing effects
might increase the number of possible injuries in an almost indefi-
nite way. If so, then moral hazard might make it almost impossible
for the insurer to even quote a price at which it would be willing to
sell an insurance policy.
In this respect, Shavell's Proof is even more potent than he
seems to realize. To further assess its potency, we should consider
the standards of tort liability to which it applies. While Shavell de-
123 A related problem of adverse selection also can pose a threat to the viability of
liability insurance. This problem relates to those parties whose tortious conduct-for
example, selling defective products, or creating dangerous conditions on property-may
have taken place before they apply for liability insurance, even though no injuries have
yet occurred.
In addition, since the Law of Large Numbers on which insurance rests assumes that
the risk posed by each insured is independent, liability insurance becomes problematic
when risks among insureds are highly correlated. For example, the risk that courts will
expand liability rules during the life of insurance policies is a risk that is common among
all insureds. See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 517, 536 (1984).
124 See S. SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 207, 209.
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velops his Proof solely in the context of negligence liability, every-
thing that he says about liability for negligent harms obviously
applies with equal or greater force to liability for intentional torts.
Indeed, in this respect actual insurer practices tend to confirm the
Proof. Insurance policies typically contain an exclusion for "inten-
tional" harms,' 25 and the standard explanation for this exclusion is
that intentional harms are under the control of the insured in a way
that makes insurance inadvisable.' 2r Likewise, nuisance liability is
frequently excluded from insurance policies-for the apparent rea-
son that a nuisance is a "highly expectable" consequence of the in-
sured's deliberate choice of conduct.' 27
What is the relevance of Shavell's Proof, however, to strict lia-
bility? Since his Proof rests on the ability of a defendant to avoid
liability in a reasonable-cost way, Shavell seems to assume that his
Proof has no major application to strict liability situations.1 28 Yet
this is a concession that seems excessive, at least when insurance is
flatly priced. In many of the cases covered by a strict liability rule,
the prospect of liability is indeed economically unpreventable-the
defendant is not able to eliminate individual risks in a reasonable-
cost fashion. For these cases, the defendant who is averse to the
prospect of liability will clearly have an incentive to insure. Yet for
some proportion of the instances covered by the strict liability rule,
the defendant may in fact be in an appropriate position to eliminate
risks. Flat insurance could, however, eliminate his interest in taking
advantage of this position. Perceiving this, insurance companies of-
fering this insurance will include a moral-hazard surcharge in their
125 See ROBERT E. KEETON, supra note 8, at 286-87, 292-93. The basic notion here is
that intentional harms are not sufficiently "fortuitous" to justify insurance. Id. at 286-
87. The intentional harm doctrine is a blend of a public-policy prohibition and an "im-
plied exception" read into the insurance policy. See id. at 292-93. Note that the insur-
ance concept of intentional harm can be considerably narrower than the doctrinal
concept of intentional tort. See id. at 287, 293.
126 See id. at 297-98.
127 Id. at 298-99.
128 See S. SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 211. Shavell does suggest, however, that the
insurance policy can be expected to provide less than complete coverage. Id. He is very
vague, however, as to the form of partial insurance that he has in mind. See id. at 193,
204, 223. And he ignores the significant coordination costs that commonly accompany
partial insurance arrangements. See supra notes 17, 18, 105.
When defendants are covered by a strict liability rule, insurers could possibly offer
reduced-premium policies that would exclude coverage when the insured's conduct is
negligent in fact. But because of the risk of error in adjudicating negligence and the
partial uncontrollability of negligent conduct, defendants would find such offers of in-
surance unattractive. Alternatively, insurance policies might exclude certain well de-
fined and clearly controllable instances of negligence (for example, failing to fence in a
swimming pool). However, I have rarely heard of actual exclusions of this sort. Insurers
do routinely exclude intentional harms; also, they sometimes exclude specific high-risk
activites (for example, trampolines on public-school playgrounds).
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price; facing that surcharge, the insurance applicant may well be
able to economize by reducing risks as an alternative to purchasing
insurance. On balance, then, for defendants who are subject to a
rule of strict liability, whether it is or is not intelligent to purchase
flatly priced insurance depends on a number of variables, including
both the composition of the instances of conduct covered by the rule
and the extent of the defendant's risk aversion relative to those risks
that the defendant is unable to eliminate through a reasonable
effort.
Shavell's First Proof in this way merits partial extension into the
territory covered by strict liability. Moreover, in this partially ex-
tended form the Proof can again be confirmed by real-world obser-
vations. One broad instance of confirmation is provided by the field
of liability ex contractu. Consider the builder who enters a contract
to complete a certain structure within two years. His ability to com-
ply with his contract will depend, to a considerable extent, on the
operation of chance-what happens over time, for example, to the
price and availability of the labor and materials he will need. 29
Still, to a major extent his ability to satisfy the contract and hence
avoid liability will depend on the effort he exerts in seeking to com-
ply with the contract. Insurance companies firmly believe, however,
that the protection afforded by a liability insurance policy would
substantially reduce the effort that the builder would be willing to
put forth. Given this belief, insurance companies are usually unwill-
ing to offer insurance for breach-of-contract liability.1 30
The expanded version of Shavell's First Proof also receives con-
firmation from practices within the actual world of tort. The cost of
liability insurance soared for many lines of insurance during the
mid-1970s; it exploded all over again in the mid-1980s. As a re-
sponse to each of these insurance crises, many institutions-whose
liability primarily rests on strict liability principles, especially vicari-
ous liability13 '-concluded that they could reduce their overall costs
by curtailing insurance coverage while at the same time setting up
ambitious programs of risk management-programs that are evi-
dently effective in reducing the number of liability-producing inci-
dents. The Southern California Rapid Transit District provides one
example of an institution that has moved in the direction of self-
129 Of course, the builder, seeking to avoid these risks, can contract for future deliv-
ery of goods and services.
130 Construction contracts often require the contractor to obtain a performance
bond for the face amount of the contract. Any default by the contractor then gives his
victim the benefit of the bond. However, the bonding company, as a surety, can claim
reimbursement from the contractor; accordingly, such a bond does not raise the moral
hazard problem that is associated with actual liability insurance.
131 See supra note 53.
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insurance and risk management; 3 2 UCLA affords another exam-
ple.133 In 1978, the spokesman for one pool of newly self-insured
hospitals in Alabama reported that "being self-insured, our mem-
bers have become much more safety conscious, and we've reduced
our claims payouts to about one-third of what they used to be."'13 4
A 1988 Newsweek article on "The Surge in Self-Insurance" reported
that "once self-insured, companies often become safety zealots" and
then enumerated a number of safety measures that newly self-in-
sured entities had implemented. 3 5
These various illustrations encourage a general observation. In
our society, there is a tendency for people to assume that for liability
insurance to be unavailable signifies some breakdown in the overall
functioning of the tort system.'36 But such an assumption may well
be misguided. The unavailability of insurance-far from revealing
that the system is malfunctioning-may verify that it is functioning
very effectively as a deterrence regime: that it is targeting for liabil-
ity precisely those forms of conduct that are so readily controllable
by defendants as to render unacceptable to insurers the moral-haz-
ard prospect of insurance policies. 137 Admittedly, I should be care-
ful in not pushing this point too far. It is difficult to interpret the
mid-1980s crisis in insurance availability as a consequence of moral-
hazard considerations: for it is implausible that the prospect of
moral hazard had become vastly more serious, in any general way,
between 1980 and 1985. Nevertheless, at least selected aspects of
the recent insurance crisis do invite being interpreted along the
lines of moral hazard. The refusal of insurance companies to write
policies for pollution torts unless they are "sudden and acciden-
132 Telephone interview with Chauncey Isom, SCRTD Risk Management Office (July
19, 1989).
133 Telephone interview with Robert Torres, UCLA Risk Management Department
(July 19, 1989).
134 See Christopher Evans, To Cut High Premiums Costs, More Firms and Institutions are
Insuring Themselves, Wall St. J., April 14, 1978, at 36, col. 1.
135 See The Surge in Self-Insurance, NEWSWEEK, March 7, 1988, at 74; see also Michael
Brody, When Products Turn to Liability, FORTUNE, March 3, 1986, at 20, 23:
The crisis in liability insurance has made risk management a main
concern for top corporate decision-makers," says Robert H. Malott,
chairman of FMC Corp.... Like other sophisticated corporations, FMC
uses "preventive law" programs to reduce the company's exposure to
suits. Such programs can include a so-called legal audit of a corpora-
tion's businesses, identifying products, services, or manufacturing opera-
tions that could trigger lawsuits, and either cleaning them up or
scrapping them.
136 See, e.g., GeorgeJ. Church, Sorry, Your Policy is Cancelled, TIME, March 24, 1986, at
16.
137 For an interesting yet curious argument that problems of adverse selection
caused this crisis, see Priest, supra note 37, at 1539-40.
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tal" 38 and the insistence of directors-and-officers insurers on ex-
cluding coverage for the action taken on merger offers 139 may well
be due to insurers' assessments that the gradual release of pollu-
tants and the rejection of takeover offers are so within the defend-
ants' control as to render inadvisable a regime of insurance.
In any event, there is ample reason to believe that Shavell's
First Proof contains an important message as to insurance availabil-
ity. Nevertheless, even in its prime application to insurance for neg-
ligence liability, the Proof seems too strong. What the Proof tends
to predict is an absence of such insurance out there in the real
world. At this point, however, reality seems to confound the Proof's
prediction. It is true enough that self-insurance has become increas-
ingly common in the programs of large institutions. Still, almost
every doctor purchases a very substantial liability insurance policy,
as do many other professionals who face a substantial prospect of
malpractice liability. Ordinary homeowners routinely purchase lia-
bility insurance against the threat of homeowner's liability, which is
essentially based on a negligence principle. Even before auto insur-
ance became quasi-mandatory, almost half of all American motorists
purchased liability insurance to cover the risk of negligence liabil-
ity;' 40 currently, in an era of mandatory insurance, most motorists
purchase auto insurance at levels well in excess of legal require-
ments. In all, there is a huge market for all of these insurance
policies.
How, then, should the Proof be reconciled with the evidence of
a strong market for negligence liability insurance? One explanation
is provided by Shavell himself, who connects the motives for
purchasing insurance to problems of "uncertainty over the determi-
nation of negligence"-the possibility of a defendant being found
negligent "through some type of error or lapse" on the part of the
fact-finder. ' 4' As explained above, the risk of error in adjudicating a
138 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 952-54 (1988).
139 There also may be an adverse-selection explanation for the exclusion of merger
decisions in D&O insurance: directors may be especially likely to apply for that insur-
ance if they are privately aware that during the insurance year they will likely be voting
on risky corporate deals. See George L. Priest, Understanding the Liability Crisis, in NEw
DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 196, 210 (Walter Olson ed. 1988).
140 See Richard C. Wagner, Safety Responsibility Laws-A Review of Recent Developments, 9
GA. BJ. 160, 166 (1946).
141 See S. SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 212. This point is also made and emphasized by
Posner. R. POSNER, supra note 121. It is made-but deemphasized-by Polinsky. See A.
M. POLINSKY, supra note 122, at 71 n.45. See also P. DANZON, supra note 107, at 124-25,
suggesting that the legal system frequently errs in not holding doctors liable when they
are guilty of malpractice, and claiming that the prospect of this error encourages doctors
to purchase malpractice insurance. Danzon's presentation here is much too terse; but
her point may well be that when the primary prospect facing defendants is the under-
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defendant's liability is one of the risks against which he might seek
to protect himself through insurance, and this is a risk that he can-
not stave off merely by adopting reasonable-cost precautions.1 42 So
far, the problem has been characterized as one of prospective jury
error. But once again, a related problem concerns the inherent un-
certainty in basic tort concepts. Much of the time, for example, the
numbers deemed controlling by the Hand negligence formula sim-
ply are not available in the real world: the defendant cannot consult
those numbers at the time he acts, and the jury cannot rely on these
numbers at the time it decides. 143 Accordingly, even though the de-
fendant makes an intelligent effort to avoid negligence in his con-
duct, there is still a clear possibility that even an intelligent jury will
render a finding of negligence.1 44 To be sure, given the variables
that the Hand formula identifies, in many cases a finding of negli-
gence (or non-negligence) can easily and properly be rendered. In
other cases, however, the negligence standard-which economists
tend to treat as though it were characteristically capable of produc-
ing objective, clear-cut results-is instead surrounded by a consider-
able degree of unknowability. 145
The points so far have concerned the defendant's imperfect
ability to avoid liability under the negligence standard. Observe,
however, that an insurance policy protects the insured not only from
the cost of actual liability but also from the cost of mounting a legal
defense against claims of negligence that the jury may eventually
find to be unmeritorious. Even if the Proof is correct in supposing
that a defendant can avoid negligence at a cost less than the cost of a
liability insurance policy, it does not follow that he can, by incurring
reasonable costs, avoid all the conduct that might give rise to an
ultimately unsuccessful tort claim. The way in which every claim,
regardless of its ultimate merits, can subject defendants to substan-
tial defense costs provides another explanation for the demand for
negligence liability insurance. 146
enforcement of valid claims, defendants will tend to indulge in negligence whether they
are insured or not.
142 See supra text accompanying note 54.
143 Hand himself fully appreciated this. See Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d
Cir. 1949).
144 See supra text accompanying note 54.
145 Consider, for example, the question "what is the value of life?"-a question that
can arise in many negligence cases in which the defendant's conduct entails some risk of
a fatal accident. For the wide range in economists' estimates of life value, and for discus-
sions of the real vulnerabilities in their methodologies, see JOHN H. MENDELOFF, THE
DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION 22-52 (1988); Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Work-
ers' Compensation, Wages, and the Risk of Injury, in NEw PERSPECTIVES ON WORKERS' COM-
PENSATION 71, 78-81 (John F. Burton ed. 1988).
146 To be sure, this point may well be an offshoot of earlier points concerning the
risks ofjury error and the range of uncertainty injury decision-making. If plaintiffs (and
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The combination, then, of the costs of defending against un-
meritorious suits, the costs of being subjected to liability when the
jury errs, and the chance of bearing liability when there is genuine
uncertainty in the negligence standard provides an explanation for
why many defendants, despite Shavell's First Proof, purchase negli-
gence liability insurance. And as it happens, this explanation seems
supported by certain real-world practices.1 47 Still, in my judgment
the explanation is no more than partial. A defendant's concern with
the costs of litigation would induce him merely to buy an insurance
policy whose coverage would be limited to litigation costs; and if his
concern ran to the risk of liability on account of dubious negligence
findings, then the policy he would want to purchase might exclude
coverage of all instances of clear, undeniable negligence. Neverthe-
less, the typical insurance policy-while containing an exclusion for
intentional harms-provides nearly comprehensive coverage for
harms resulting from negligence. Not even gross negligence or
recklessness is excepted.' 48
Given the insights afforded by Shavell's First Proof, how should
the existence of these policies be interpreted? As an economist,
Shavell primarily relies on the conventional economic understand-
ing of negligent conduct.1 49 As Bruce Ackerman points out, from
the economist's perspective "there can be no such thing as an acci-
dent";' 50 negligence essentially consists of a defendant's deliberate
choice to engage in conduct the riskiness of which he distinctly ap-
defendants) could fully anticipate in advance that defendants will secure jury verdicts in
all cases in which defendants should secure such verdicts, then plaintiffs would have no
apparent incentive to file the suits that give rise to such verdicts-suits that require de-
fendants to incur defense costs in order to bring those verdicts about.
147 Doctors, for example, plainly are dismayed by the expensiveness of defending
against malpractice claims and by the prospect of what they regard as improper or unin-
formed jury deliberations. Manufacturers complain of the shagginess of the negligence-
like risk-benefit tests, see, e.g., Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.
1979), which, as applied by the jury, determine their liability in design defect cases. See,
e.g., Brody, supra note 135:
But preventive law can do only so much. No matter how carefully
decisions on product design have been documented and justified, it is
virtually impossible to prove to a court equipped with 20/20 hindsight
that a design could not have been improved upon. Riddell, whose foot-
ball helmets protect the pros, was recently slapped with a $12-million
judgment in the case of a high school football player who broke his neck
in a scrimmage. The jury decided the helmet should have carried a
sticker warning players of the danger of butting opponents with it. Rid-
dell has appealed the case.
148 See R. KEETON, supra note 8, at 298-99. To be sure, a gross negligence exclusion
might invite extensive (and expensive) litigation.
149 But see infra note 155. See also S. SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 213, where Shavell, in
discussing motives to buy insurance, refers very tersely to conduct that defendants "are
unable to control."
150 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 50 (1983).
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preciates. The very rationale for negligence liability endorsed by
economists builds on the assumption of the defendant's rational
choice among alternative courses of conduct, an assumption that
likewise underlies Shavell's First Proof.
Nevertheless, this is an assumption of behavioral rationality that
most of us non-economists would find somewhat excessive. To be
sure, our own understanding acknowledges that many instances of
possibly tortious conduct-for example, a manufacturer's selection
of a design for its product--do comply with the norm of rational
choice. However, our understanding is that many other instances of
negligence seem essentially unchosen and inadvertent-obvious in-
stances of what the layman indeed refers to as "accidents." 151 A
substantial fraction of negligent driving seems in this sense acciden-
tal; moreover, many instances of medical malpractice evidently en-
tail no more than a "momentary lapse of a doctor acting under the
pressure of a busy practice."' 5 2 Now in suggesting here that there is
a range of inadvertent negligent conduct that is imperfectly control-
lable, I should not be understood as claiming that this conduct is
not controllable at all.'53 Most motorists avoid bad driving most of
the time; similarly, most doctors usually are able to avoid malprac-
tice. The operation of normal first-party incentives, as supple-
mented by tort liability incentives, is commonly effective in
discouraging this negligence. One can, however, concede all of this
while still observing that a defendant's power to prevent inadvertent
negligence is much less than complete; and so long as the defendant
appreciates this point, he will have a reason to buy a negligence in-
surance policy. 154
151 "The present inability of economists to model lapses [in parties' behavior] is a
serious weakness in the economic analysis of law." Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages
for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1143, 1174 (1989). For my earlier
effort to draw attention to this weakness, see Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Compara-
tive Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697 (1978).
152 P. Weiler, supra note 2, at 10. For a similar account of how malpractice happens,
see JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAwsurr LOTTERY 26 (1979), which suggests that
"[o]verwhelmingly accidents are just that-'accidents' ".
153 Of course, a person can reduce the likelihood of negligent motoring by deciding
not to drive, and a doctor can reduce the likelihood of inadvertent malpractice by seeing
fewer patients per day. These are, however, not the choices that negligence law (eco-
nomically interpreted) wants defendants to make. But see supra text accompanying notes
111-13.
154 See Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and
the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 293, 306 (1988).
I can invite the reader to clarify his own attitudes towards the preventability of neg-
ligence by asking him to consider what his response would be to several hypothetical
auto insurance company offers-offers of the precise sort that are suggested by Shavell's
First Proof. Offer 1: The insurer will significantly reduce the insurance premium so
long as the liability policy excludes accidents caused by the insured's drunk driving.
This is an offer which, I suspect, many insureds would find attractive; drunk driving
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Let me now bring together the several observations generated
by considering Shavell's First Proof. To the extent that a defendant,
operating under a standard of either negligence liability or strict lia-
bility, can, through an appropriate effort, reduce the incidence of his
tortious conduct, it may make sense for him to turn down a liability
insurance contract. Even so, for several reasons a willingness to
bear reasonable burdens cannot eliminate the risk of liability. One
reason is that a rule of strict liability, if applicable, can subject a
defendant to a liability exposure that cannot be avoided, even in
form, by the incurring of reasonable expenditures; a second reason
is that the incurring of expenditures that the defendant deems rea-
sonable cannot prevent the jury from rendering an erroneous or
doubtful finding of negligence; a third reason is that there are cer-
tain forms of legally negligent conduct that a defendant can realisti-
cally control in part but not in whole. 155 Given this combination 6f
seems to be the kind of conduct that most of us can control and hence avoid. Offer 2:
The premium reduction is tied to an exclusion of accidents caused by the motorist's
gross speeding-speeding that is at least 25 mph in excess of the speed limit. This, too,
is an offer that I think many motorists would regard as appealing, on account of the
apparent controllability of the extreme misbehavior that the exclusion targets. Offer 3:
The premium reduction is tied to an exclusion for all accidents caused by speeding.
Here I am much less certain that the offer would be widely accepted; ordinary speeding
is a negligent activity that many of us think we have an incomplete ability to avoid. Offer
4: The reduction is tied to an exclusion for all accidents caused by the insured's absent-
mindedly taking his eyes off the road. Here I am quite certain that most of us would find
this offer unacceptable. An absent-minded failure of perception may clearly come within
the law's definition of negligence; yet most motorists understand that as a practical mat-
ter their ability to prevent such negligence is clearly imperfect, and that insurance there-
fore provides a very important form of protection.
To be sure, in these hypotheticals the factor of self-selection would obviously be
important. Offer 1 would look especially bad to a driver with a drinking problem, espe-
cially good to a driver who is a teetotaler. Moreover, liability for speeding may be an
imperfect example of pure negligence liability. The tort definition of speeding results
from the interaction of statutory speed limits and the common-law doctrine of negli-
gence per se. Yet the speed limits enacted by public authorities may in some instances
be well below the limits that the common-law's Learned Hand test would itself
authorize.
155 In short, the demand for flatly priced negligence liability insurance may well re-
veal the (partial) inaccuracy of the economist's conventional assumption of rational
human conduct.
The special quality of "inattentive" negligence has recently been attended to by
Professors Shavell and Grady. According to Shavell, "a party may be unable to control
completely his momentary level of care." S. SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 81. That is, a
party can perhaps control his momentary carefulness 95% of the time, but not 100% of
the time. Yet courts insist on looking at the negligence question in the context of rea-
sonable conduct in the individual case. Therefore, courts end up disregarding the normal
5% inattention rate. See id. Shavell seems uncertain as to whether this disregard is eco-
nomically intelligent. See id. at 82-83.
According to Grady, parties do in fact fully "choose" the "level of advertance" that
they will display in their day-to-day conduct. Grady, supra note 154, at 306. However,
since always paying attention would entail significant costs, a rational actor will "choose
to be [inadvertant] some of the time." Id. at 295. Yet courts, in making findings of
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reasons, there remains a strong demand for liability insurance. This
demand relates, in part, to torts that the defendant cannot ade-
quately prevent. Even so, once this insurance is in place, insofar as
it is flatly priced there is a moral-hazard likelihood of a reduction in
a defendant's safety efforts-a reduction that will tend to increase
the level of the defendant's tortious conduct that is dearly
preventable. 156
Worrying about the various facets of moral hazard, an econo-
mist such as Thomas Schelling finds it appropriate to conclude that
flatly priced liability insurance offends the norm of economic effi-
ciency. 157 This conclusion may, however, be premature. As noted
in Part II, if both insurer and insured do agree on an insurance con-
tract, their agreement indicates that the contract enhances the wel-
fare of each. This, however, is a contract that has an external effect
on a third party-the person who suffers an injury on account of the
effects of moral hazard. 158 At first, this third party seems like a clear
negligence, deliberately ignore these costs. Id. at 302-03. As a result, what is ostensibly
a negligence standard ends up including a major measure of "strict liability." Id. at 307.
Grady seems uncertain as to whether this judicial practice is economically intelligent. Id.
at 309-10 ("The no-forgetting rule ... has both advantages and disadvantages .... ).
In any event, Grady is able to render inattentive behavior in compliance with eco-
nomic norms of rational conduct only by asserting that one's momentary level of atten-
tion is fully controlled by one's prior choices. He offers, however, no proof for this
assertion, which most of us would regard as counterintuitive. See Schwartz, supra note
151, at 718. Shavell, by conceding that parties cannot completely control their own con-
duct, comes close to conceding my point that the phenomenon of inattentive conduct
impairs the economist's notion of behavioral rationality. Moreover, as Shavell and
Grady enlarge their analyses to take the phenomenon of inattentive conduct into ac-
count, they are required to depart from economic conventions in important ways. Each
is led to recognize that in many negligence cases the basic economic rationale for the
doctrine of negligence liability does not apply-and to acknowledge that in such cases
the imposition of liability is, in fact, economically problematic.
156 Having explained here how uncertainties in the negligence standard help create
a demand for completely flat insurance, let me now comment on how this explanation
relates to the existing law-and-economics literature on the uncertainty question. In a
leading article, Galfee and Craswell contend that uncertainties in the application of the
negligence standard in some ways discourage defendants from adopting appropriate
precautions, but in other ways encourage defendants to adopt excessive precautions.
On balance, they conclude, the tendency towards excessive precautions is likely to
predominate. John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965 (1984). By bringing in the insurance factor, my
Article identifies an important way-unnoticed by Calfee and Graswell-in which uncer-
tainty induces inadequate precautions, at least to the extent that insurance is flatly
priced. Negligence-standard uncertainties encourage defendants who might otherwise
go bare to instead purchase flatly priced liability insurance-and once that insurance is
in place, moral hazard may induce defendants to adopt a lower level of precautions than
negligence law anticipates.
157 See Thomas C. Schelling, An Economist Looks at Risk and Liability, in RISK, COMPEN-
SATION AND LIABILrry: THE POLICE CHOICES 53, 64-66 (1986) (proceedings of a confer-
ence held at Yale University).
158 The Breeden majority accepted as important precedent previous holdings af-
firming the legality of fire insurance contracts protecting the insured against the conse-
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and dramatic victim of the insurance contract. 15 9 Notice, however,
that this victim, by hypothesis, possesses a tort compensation right
against the defendant. In the absence of liability insurance, the vic-
tim would have avoided injury altogether. With liability insurance,
he suffers injury and the losses associated with injury-but he also is
provided with the benefits of tort compensation to cover those
losses. 160 So long as tort compensation is sufficiently complete, the
package of injury-plus-compensation provides the victim with a sat-
isfactory substitute for the avoidance of injury.
This describes the reasoning that Professor Shavell pursues in
reaching his conclusion that even completely flat liability insurance
is consistent with the standard of economic efficiency. 16 1 Call this
Shavell's Second Insurance Proof, a Proof that has been acceded to
by Posner and Landes. 162 Without doubt, there is real power and
quences of his own negligence. 220 Mo. at 431, 119 S.W. at 608. The dissent thought
such holdings clearly distinguishable, because first-party insurance is "wholly between
the parties entering into the contract and affects no other ... persons except those
mentioned in the policy." Id. at 359, 119 S.W. at 583-84.
159 Here I should deviate from the text's economic analysis in order to set forth one
fairness point. It might be argued that it is unfair for a defendant to injure the plaintiff
by the defendant's improper conduct-and that tort law, by placing sanctions on im-
proper conduct, can contribute to fairness by discouraging people from engaging in that
conduct. This argument certainly relates to deterrence; hence it resembles the liability-
rule analysis undertaken by economists. Still, the argument refers to deterrence for the
sake of fairness rather than deterrence for purposes of efficiency. An efficiency analysis
of deterrence is required to acknowledge, as my text here suggests, a significant number
of "ifs, ands, and buts" concerning the welfare of the insured and the insurer. These are
acknowledgments that might not be required if deterrence were justified by the criterion
of fairness. Nevertheless, the welfare that liability insurance produces is closely associ-
ated with what might well be deemed the fairness advantages of liability insurance, ad-
vantages that any overall fairness evaluation would want to take into account. See supra
text accompanying note 43. Accordingly, the advocate of deterrence-as-fairness, like the
proponent of efficient deterrence, is required to engage in some form of balancing.
160 The Breeden dissent, insofar as it analogized liability insurance to a disclaimer of
liability, inadequately appreciated this point. See 220 Mo. at 355, 119 S.W. at 582.
161 See S. SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 212-13, concluding that this insurance is "socially
desirable." Shavell reaches this conclusion by relying on certain assumptions; my text
now considers the accuracy of these assumptions in the context of American tort law.
162 See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 13. To be sure, there is something
extremely curious about the Proof. The economic theory of tort law is generally ori-
ented around the goal of optimal deterrence; the compensation received by the plaintiff
is viewed primarily as a device to encourage plaintiffs to bring those suits that will
achieve deterrence objectives. Suddenly, given Shavell's Second Proof, the economists'
priorities seem reversed: the compensation afforded to the tort victim becomes, in a
sense, the justification for the elimination of deterrence that is occasioned by a flat insur-
ance policy.
Shavell and Landes & Posner each support Shavell's Second Proof in portions of
their books that consider insurance issues. Other passages in their books discuss why
the incidence of negligent conduct is as high as it seems to be; and in these passages
each book curiously omits any reference to liability insurance. See S. SHAVELL, supra note
3, at 83-84; W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 72-73. What can, perhaps, be
inferred from these omissions is that the authors are somewhat uneasy about the Second
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ingenuity in this Proof. It concedes the premise relied on by many
tort scholars: that liability insurance can frustrate deterrence. Yet it
refutes the conclusion these scholars profess to draw: that this frus-
tration invalidates the economic rationale for tort liability rules.
Even in acknowledging, however, the ingenuity of the Proof,
we can observe that the Proof, with its benign conclusion as to the
efficiency of insurance, may well rest on an inadequate understand-
ing of how the tort system works. In order to collect what tort law
describes as full compensation, the tort victim must ordinarily se-
cure the services of a lawyer, who will reduce by one-third the com-
pensation the victim receives. Because of this transaction cost, even
if damage rules were one hundred percent complete the successful
plaintiff would nevertheless suffer a net loss of thirty-three per-
cent. 6 3 In addition, those damage rules obviously fail to achieve
completeness. In cases of serious disability or serious pain and suf-
fering, tort law plainly undercompensates, in the sense of awarding
a sum of money that no plaintiff would regard as an adequate substi-
tute for the experience he undergoes. If the defendant's tort results
in the victim's death, the defendant in a wrongful death action is not
required to pay for the value of the life to the victim himself; for that
matter, even if life-value were somehow included in wrongful-death
damages, the actual victim would obviously be prevented from re-
ceiving this portion of the award.
Certain implications of the above observations should here be
drawn out. From the vantage point of basic tort deterrence theory,
the modest measure of damages in wrongful death actions is seri-
ously inefficient. 16 4 The impact of these rules on liability insurance
essentially serves to make a bad situation worse. That basic deter-
rence theory, however, does not disapprove in the same way of the
legal measure of damages for disability or pain and suffering. For
somewhat complicated reasons-relating to the manner in which a
serious injury may diminish the utility that a person achieves
through the receipt of moneyl65 -such an award may be quite high
Proof; while they support it, they still are somewhat embarrassed by the law's willingness
to sacrifice deterrence for the sake of insurability.
163 In assuming that the defendant's liability equals the plaintiff's recovery, see S.
SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 218, 223, Shavell adopts a model that essentially assumes away
the plaintiff's litigation costs. An earlier article of mine adverts to these costs in critiqu-
ing the conventional economic rationale for contributory negligence rules. See Schwartz,
supra note 151, at 711-12.
164 See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 187-89.
165 An award is high enough for deterrence purposes if it could compensate poten-
tial victims ex ante for their bearing of risk. The problem is that the incurring of serious
injury may (among other things) enormously impair a person's ability to derive satisfac-
tion from the receipt of money. See David Friedman, What is "Fair Compensation"for Death
or Injury?, 2 IM'L. REv. L. & ECON. 81 (1982). Hence any award that fully compensates
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enough to satisfy the basics of ex ante deterrence theory even
though it clearly does not provide ex post compensation to an indi-
vidual plaintiff which leaves that plaintiff perceiving that he has been
completely compensated for the injury he has incurred. Still, that
latter measure of full after-the-fact compensation is what Shavell's
Proof requires; 166 the law's unwillingness (or inability) to require
such compensation hence impugns that Proof.
In short, enforcement costs and limitations on tort damage
rules render most victims "worse off" by converting injury avoid-
ance into the package of injury-and-compensation; indeed, some
victims, particularly those of fatal accidents, are disastrously disad-
vantaged by this conversion.1 67 Accordingly, even though liability
insurance distinctly benefits insureds, to the extent that it is flatly
priced it subjects victims to a significant burden. Now consider a
shift from a society (such as the United States in 1850) in which
there is no liability insurance to a post-Breeden society (such as ours)
in which primarily flat insurance policies exist and are judicially vali-
dated. Economic efficiency in the Pareto-superior sense requires
that a judicial ruling enhance the welfare of at least one person
ex post would need to be vastly higher than the award that fully reflects the risk ex ante.
Shavell's assumptions, however, ignore this differential.
166 For reasons relating to the theory offirst-party insurance, some economists have
recently argued for a sharp reduction in the size of tort awards. See, e.g., P. DANZON,
supra note 107, at 155-57.
167 My analysis here follows Breeden:
For if it be conceded that in personal injury cases the injured party or
his representatives have been fully compensated from a moneyed stand-
point by the person who caused his injury, yet that would not restore the
injured party or his family to its status quo, for the obvious reason that if
he is killed no power on earth can restore the life which had been use-
lessly sacrificed .... And in case the injured person is not killed but seri-
ously injured and crippled, then money could not compensate for the
physical pain and mental anguish suffered by him, or compensate him for
the joys and pleasures wrongfully taken from him.
220 Mo. at 361, 119 S.W. at 585.
Shavell concedes in a footnote that his analysis affirming the social desirability of
liability insurance "obviously changes if victims are not fully compensated for losses."
S. SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 212 n.9. On two later occasions, however, in restating his
conclusion on social desirability, he omits this caveat. Id. at 213, 293. The only illustra-
tion of incomplete compensation mentioned in his footnote involves the special case of
the limited-solvency defendant. As it happens, in a 1982 article Shavell acknowledged
that the victim's injury might include a "nonmonetary component"-"perhaps blind-
ness or paralysis"-that cannot be adequately compensated for by money. See Steven
Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELLJ. ECON. 120, 128 (1982). This acknowledge-
ment, however, does not get carried forward into his 1987 book.
In endorsing Shavell's favorable assessment of liability insurance, Landes and Pos-
ner explicitly assume "that victims indeed are fully compensated." W. LANDES & R. Pos-
NER, supra note 3, at 13. They do not indicate; however, the likely inaccuracy of this
assumption.
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while diminishing the welfare of no one.16 8 For the judiciary, as in
Breeden, to bestow its approval on flat liability insurance appears at
first to violate the Pareto-superior standard, since there is a class of
persons who are rendered worse off by the existence of that insur-
ance policy. Admittedly, that Pareto-superiority requires a univer-
sality of non-losers makes it seem excessively precious as a standard
for real-world legal rules. 169 The milder but often more practical
Kaldor-Hicks version of economic efficiency requires that all the
welfare gains effected by a change in the rules exceed all welfare
losses; 170 it is, indeed, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion that scholars rely
on in advancing the theory that economic principles can explain
most of the common law of torts. 171 Yet a Kaldor-Hicks evaluation
of flat insurance seems at first uncertain, since one cannot conclude,
in any a priori way, that the welfare gains associated with this insur-
ance do (or do not) outnumber the welfare losses. To set forth this
assessment is, of course, to say that flatly priced liability insurance
apparently affects the distribution of wealth between injurers and
victims, benefitting the former at the expense of the latter.
To be sure, my analysis until now has assumed a world in which
injurers and victims form separate classes. This assumption holds
up well in many tort settings: for example, suits by innocent by-
standers against parties who manufacture defective products or en-
gage in ultrahazardous activities. In other tort settings, however,
the assumption may partake of an excessively ex post character.
Motoring provides one illustration of an important tort activity in
which the individual motorist might wind up as either a tort plaintiff
or a tort defendant. Hence that motorist is eventually eligible to
receive both the benefits and the detriments associated with liability
insurance.' 72 Also, many potential plaintiffs are in commercial rela-
tionships with potential defendants. Given those relationships, the
benefits that insurance provides to the latter may provide some ben-
efits to the former as well; 173 conversely, the burdens borne by po-
168 SeeJules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
509, 515-17 (1980).
169 See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 489 (1980).
170 See Coleman, supra note 168, at 513-14, 518-20.
171 See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 16; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OFJusTIcE 92 (2d ed. 1983) ("[M]ost economists say Pareto but use Kaldor-
Hicks in making welfare judgments.").
172 Of course, as auto insurance practices reveal, some classes of motorists are much
more likely to commit torts in the future than are others. Within tort law, an ex ante
identity of victims and injurers is the exception rather than the rule.
173 On its facts, Breeden concerned an employer's tort liability to its employee. Ac-
cording to the Breeden majority, the benefit that the employer receives from liability in-
surance "promotes business... and thereby increases the demand for labor and tends
to improve wages .... " 220 Mo. at 430, 119 S.W. at 608.
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tential plaintiffs on account of moral hazard can be indirectly
experienced by potential defendants.
These circumstances do not affect my previous point that the
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency of liability insurance seems a priori uncer-
tain. They do complicate, however, the general claims that liability
insurance actually fails the Pareto efficiency test and that it affects
the distribution of wealth between victims and injurers. While these
claims are quite sound in many tort settings, in other settings the ex
ante reevaluation conducted here suggests that the claims are some-
what premature. Instead, in these settings uncertainty should be
recognized as the appropriate Pareto appraisal as well; moreover,
the effect of liability insurance on societal wealth distribution can be
evaluated as similarly uncertain.
In identifying the weaknesses in Shavell's Second Proof, this
Article so far has emphasized indeterminacy as the relevant eco-
nomic evaluation for flatly priced liability insurance. The positive
economic theory of tort law stipulates that all (or nearly all) com-
mon law tort doctrines rest on an economic foundation.' 74 The un-
certain efficiency of flatly priced liability insurance poses something
of an embarrassment to that theory; what is more, Shavell's Second
Proof provides another example of the tendency of economic ana-
lysts to unduly simplify actual legal arrangements in order to reach
their conclusions that particular rules are indeed efficient. How-
ever, if we are willing to complicate our analysis, we can somewhat
strengthen the claim on behalf of the efficiency of flatly priced insur-
ance. Four factors can here be identified, each of which might pro-
vide that claim with some support.1 75
The first factor concerns the manner in which flatly priced in-
surance transmits costs to defendants. Assume a defendant who en-
gages in an activity that is covered by a negligence liability rule and
who buys a flatly priced insurance policy. In doing so, the defend-
ant will encounter the average liability cost associated with that ac-
tivity, as calculated by insurance companies. Accordingly, even
though flatly priced insurance may undermine defendant's incen-
tives to adopt precautions in the course of an activity, that insurance
nevertheless gives defendants an incentive to take the prospect of
liability into account in determining which activities to engage in.176
The combination of liability-plus-flat-insurance clearly exerts an ef-
174 See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 1, 21-24.
175 A fifth factor relates to what might be a more realistic evaluation of the deter-
rence potential of liability rules. See supra note 119. Notice, also, that strict liability aims
at influencing precautions as well as activity decision; liability-with-flat-insurance can af-
fect only the latter.
176 Keep in mind that even flat insurance premiums are largely based on a defend-
ant's activity. See supra note 21.
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fect on the volume of risky activities that would be lacking in a no-
liability situation. 77 Moreover, no doubt many parties who buy in-
surance under statutory mandates have so little wealth that, without
insurance, they would be unconcerned about the threat of negli-
gence liability in selecting their precautions. For such parties, the
incentives for appropriate activity decisions afforded by liability-
plus-compulsory-insurance can be seen as a pure safety gain for
which insurance can take credit. As noted above, the control of ac-
tivity decisions is an objective ordinarily associated with strict liabil-
ity.' 78 In light of that objective, flatly priced insurance can be
understood as providing a strict-liability dimension to all of tort
liability.' 79
The second factor concerns the added compensation that liabil-
ity insurance makes possible for victims. Of course, this factor is
without relevance for the victim who would never have been injured
had it not been for the moral-hazard effects of the defendant's liabil-
ity insurance policy; nor does it have relevance when the plaintiff's
injury is of an amount that is less than the defendant's assets. Still,
on account of strict liability and the partial uncontrollability of neg-
ligent conduct, many torts would be committed even if defendants
were uninsured; moreover, as noted above, 80 in many of the suits
occasioned by these torts, the tort judgment will exceed the defend-
ant's wealth. In these cases, the compensation payment received by
the victim is enlarged by (up to) the amount of the defendant's lia-
bility insurance policy.' 8 ' Though the compensation of accident vic-
tims is not an actual objective of tort law under an economic
analysis,' 8 2 the added compensation that liability insurance provides
is a gain for (some) victims that Kaldor-Hicks economics certainly
should take into account in considering whether all the gains associ-
ated with liability insurance exceed all the losses. 18 3 Moreover, this
177 See, e.g., Richard W. Grayston, Deterrence in Automobile Liability Insurance-The Em-
pirical Evidence, 40 INS. COUNS.J. 117 (1973) (higher liability insurance premiums reduce
the incidence of motoring, and hence of negligent motoring).
178 See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
179 Observe, however, that such insurance implements that objective in a manner
that is quite distinct from its implementation under uninsured strict liability. A strict
liability regime imposes liability on defendants for all accidents caused; negligence-with-
flat-insurance imposes liability on insureds only for accidents negligently caused. Relat-
edly, there is a litigation-cost differential between strict liability and negligence liability.
180 See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
181 A defendant's motives for buying this insurance are assessed infra text accompa-
nying note 69.
182 See Coleman, supra note 75, at 1323.
183 Shavell refers to this point, but in a manner that tends to limit its significance in
assessing the efficiency of insurance. See S. SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 213 n.12, 242-43.
The victim who is risk-averse is likely to have protected himself in advance by a first-
party insurance policy. To this extent, the victim's claim against the defendant may be
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is one gain attributable to liability insurance that cuts against the
idea that this insurance redistributes wealth away from victims.
The third factor bearing on the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency of flatly
priced insurance concerns the extent of the benefits that this insur-
ance bestows on insureds. Insurance is most likely to be flatly
priced if the insured's activities give rise to only a limited number of
claims: when this number is low, insurance techniques such as expe-
rience rating and schedule rating are not feasible. Yet consider how
a low number of claims affects the benefits associated with insur-
ance. If only an occasional suit is brought against the party, his lack
of experience will make it especially difficult for him (if he is unin-
sured) to assure that his lawyer's performance is effective and loyal.
Also, the lower the number of risky episodes in which he engages,
ironically the more pure risk he faces, for the less able he is to pool
or average out risks within his own operations.' 8 4 In all, then, the
circumstances that give rise to flatly priced insurance may well tend
to enhance the benefits that insurance brings about.
The fourth factor concerns the loss control services that liability
insurers might be able to provide their insureds-services that could
generate a safety gain that could offset the safety loss associated
with moral hazard. 185 A liability insurer, by processing a large
number of claims and by conducting the reviews and inspections
that lead to its own underwriting decisions, may well become an ex-
pert in techniques of risk prevention-indeed, more of an expert
than the insured itself. If so, then this is an expertise that the in-
surer can pass on to the insured. Of course, the insured, if it thinks
it could benefit from safety recommendations, has the option of en-
tering into a contract with an outside safety consultant. Yet transac-
tion costs are reduced if the insured relies on that insurer for its
safety information rather than arranging a contract with an outside
consultant, for the insured already stands in a contractual relation-
ship with its liability insurer. In addition, the insurer acquires its
information in a natural low-cost way, as an incident to its normal
activities of underwriting and claims evaluation.
One somewhat tricky question concerns the safety-services in-
transferred to the first-party insurer, by way of subrogation or a reimbursement right.
Such a transfer benefits victims in the medium-run by reducing the cost of first-party
insurance.
184 See supra note 15.
185 This point was relied on by the Breeden majority: "[T]he employee, shipper, or
passenger.., has the added security of the vigilance, experience and self-interest of the
insurance company itself to prevent the use of negligent methods .... 220 Mo. at 430,
119 S.W. at 608 (emphasis in original). See also 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMINGJAMES,JR.
& OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS 148-55 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing insurer safety
efforts).
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centives of the parties. When operating under perfectly responsive
insurance, the incentive of the insured to accept the insurer's rec-
ommendations is obvious; any reductions the insured achieves in
the risks that it creates immediately translate into corresponding re-
ductions in the premium it is contractually obliged to pay. How-
ever, the incentive of the insurer to offer these recommendations is
problematic, since any reduction in its eventual payouts is offset by a
reduction in its premium income. Under completely flat insurance,
the incentive analysis is reversed: the insurer now has a keen inter-
est in offering safety recommendations, since its ultimate liability is
directly at stake; but the incentives of the insured to accept those
recommendations are unclear, since its premium remains constant
even if it implements the insurer's presumably costly safety
recommendations.
To be sure, even at these two insurance extremes one can iden-
tify certain non-trivial elements of mutuality in loss-control incen-
tives.18 6 A further point is that in the real world almost all liability
insurance policies lie in the intermediate range between perfect re-
sponsiveness and complete flatness. Unlike insurance at either ex-
treme-for which the safety incentives seem primarily unilateral-
intermediate insurance of this sort does bestow on the insurer and
the insured substantial bilateral incentives to cooperate in loss-con-
trol efforts. 187 Of course, the extent to which the incentives af-
forded by intermediate insurance actually translate into successful
loss-control activities is ultimately an empirical question. From
what one can tell, for example, liability insurers pay little attention
to homeowners and motorists, at least partly because these are small
accounts that do not "merit individualized attention."' 88 In addi-
tion, many product manufacturers report that they receive little
186 Under perfectly responsive insurance, prospective insureds have a keen interest
in the quality of the insurer's loss-control services; hence the pressures of the market-
place at the time insurance contracts are entered into help to explain why insurers would
offer those services. And even when insurance appears to be completely flat, many in-
sureds will have significantfirst-party incentives for accepting insurers' safety recommen-
dations, in order to prevent harm-producing incidents. For example, an assembly-line
accident that injures a worker can also damage the employer's valuable equipment and
result in costly down time; the manufacturer whose products acquire a reputation for
danger may well suffer a significant reduction in sales. Moreover, consider the insured
who rejects what the insurer regards as a reasonable safety recommendation; that in-
sured may be able to anticipate that the insurer will later be unwilling to offer the in-
sured a renewal of its policy. Of course, the sanction of nonrenewal is one form of
insurance responsiveness that demonstrates the unreality of the completely flat insur-
ance norm.
187 This is one instance in which this Article's ideal-type strategy breaks down.
188 See Sugarman, supra note 2, at 581. Examples commonly given of extensive loss-
control efforts by insurers-for example, boiler inspections by boiler insurers-tend to
concern first-party insurance rather than liability insurance.
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assistance from their liability insurers. 18 9 On the other hand, insur-
ers are very active in providing safety services to many employers
subject to workers' compensation. Also, as part of the tort liability
insurance relationship between Transamerica and the 1984 Los An-
geles Olympic Organizing Committee, Transamerica developed a
fifteen-hour training program for all LAOOC drivers, and the
LAOOC accepted Transamerica's recommendation that the
LAOOC undertake full screening (including police checks) of all its
personnel. 90
In sum, a full economic review of primarily flat liability insur-
ance needs to take a number of factors into account;' 91 in addition,
it needs to measure these factors in an empirical way. However,
data that would actually permit quantification of these factors are
currently unavailable, and are likely to remain unavailable in the
reasonable future. To this extent the overall efficiency of flatly
priced insurance remains in a significant sense indeterminate.192 If
I were encouraged to rely on intuition in order to reach some result,
my best guess would be that it is probable that this insurance is usu-
ally efficient. But I would expand on this guess by noting that the
magnitude of the relevant factors almost certainly varies from one
"line" of insurance to another; accordingly, even if many lines of
primarily flat insurance are indeed efficient, there probably are
other lines that flunk the economic test.
A review of the impact of flatly priced liability insurance on the
tort objective of deterrence hence produces somewhat complex
evaluations. When the impact of liability insurance on tort law's
189 SeeJ. O'CONNELL, supra note 152, at 24. A much more optimistic impression,
however, is conveyed by AMERICAN INSURANCE ASS'N, PRODUCT LIABILrrY INSURANCE:
UNDERWRITING, RATES, RESERVES, BUSINESS CYCLES (1979), discussing, for example, in-
surance company efforts to "modify the risk." Id. at 22.
190 Bruce Keppel, Insuring for the Games an Olympic-Size Task, L.A. Times, April 16,
1984, at IV-2, col. 6. The insurance policy contained "an extraordinarily high limit" of
coverage. Id. at col. 5.
191 To recap, these factors include the beneficial deterrent effect of flatly priced in-
surance on insureds' decisions to engage in risky activities; the welfare gains that liability
insurance entails for insureds (and insurers); the safety losses occasioned by the moral
hazard effects of flatly priced liability insurance; the extent to which those losses are
offset by loss-control services offered by insurers; as for those persons who incur injuries
on account of insurance-induced moral hazard, the extent to which tort awards do not
adequately compensate them ex post for their losses; and as for those persons who
would have incurred injuries even in the absence of liability insurance, the extent to
which that insurance adds to the compensation that they end up receiving.
192 I have no interest in affiliating myself with the extreme position that law-and-
economics is pervasively indeterminate. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981). Even so, in this and in
previous articles I do assert that there is a greater measure of indeterminacy in the eco-
nomics of tort law than its leading practitioners usually are willing to recognize. See, e.g.,
Schwartz, supra note 151, at 704-10; supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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possible fairness objectives was considered in Section II, the result-
ing evaluations were complex in a somewhat different way. Are
there further objectives attributable to tort law to which liability in-
surance might relate? This is the question addressed in Section V.
V
LIABILITY INSURANCE, VICTIM COMPENSATION, AND Loss
SPREADING
This Article already has considered, in two separate contexts,
the relevance of the compensation afforded the accident victim.
When liability insurance is analyzed from an economic perspective,
the extra compensation that it yields to the victim is a benefit to be
taken into account in determining whether liability insurance sur-
vives a Kaldor-Hicks review. Secondly, if the defendant's tort causes
an accident, then principles of compensatory or corrective justice
may require that the plaintiff receive compensation (a requirement
that liability insurance helps satisfy). When, for example, a court
states that all victims of negligence should be granted compensa-
tion,193 it is evidently the principle of compensatory justice that the
court has in mind.
Sometimes, however, tort law is more broadly associated with
the objective of cushioning the burden borne by all victims of injury
(or, by all "deserving" victims).' 94 At stake here is not any notion of
interpersonal fairness but rather a more general and supposedly
compassionate social policy in favor of victim compensation. 195 To
be sure, such a social policy, when vindicated simply by allowing the
plaintiff to recover in tort against the defendant, seems inane, for
that tort recovery merely shifts a devastating loss from the plaintiff
to the defendant, leaving the defendant as miserably burdened by
the tort judgment as the plaintiff was burdened by the original acci-
dent.' 96 The social policy of victim compensation begins to make
sense, however, if the tort defendant is a suitable loss-bearer. The
defendant may have loss-bearing abilities for a number of rea-
sons.197 First, the defendant might be a wealthy entity with deep-
193 "It is, of course, fundamental in the law of torts that any person proximately
injured by the act of another, whether that act be willful or negligent, should, in the
absence of statute or compelling reasons of public policy, be compensated." Klein v.
Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d 70, 71, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962).
194 SeeJohn G. Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort?, 44 LA. L. REv. 1193, 1203 (1984);
Williams, supra note 4, at 151-152.
195 To be sure, victims can alternatively be reimbursed by way of first-party insur-
ance. The loss-spreading rationale for tort law typically assumes (at least implicitly)
some major inadequacy in the market for first-party insurance.
196 Consider the facts in Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
197 See G. CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 39-67.
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pocket attributes. Second, the defendant may be a commercial or-
ganization that can respond to liability in a loss-spreading way by
marginally raising the prices that it charges to large numbers of its
customers. Third, the defendant, so long as he is minimally solvent,
can effectively spread the loss through the purchase of liability
insurance.
Given the importance of this third possibility, those who see
victim compensation as a major tort objective will obviously regard
liability insurance as fully acceptable. Indeed, it is an integral part
of the policy argument; liability insurance is the institution that per-
mits tort law to achieve this policy in a large number of situations in
which the policy might otherwise be incapable of implementation.
The victim compensation goal suggests that liability insurance is
highly desirable regardless of whether it is responsively or flatly
priced; indeed, it may be that liability insurance should be compul-
sory, so that the tort-insurance system can do a more effective job of
delivering compensation to needy victims.
Liability insurance is hence an essential part of tort law if victim
compensation is assumed to be the law's purpose. In some sense
liability insurance obviously has the effect or consequence of spreading
losses in some number of cases; how plausible, however, is the idea
that loss spreading is the law's actual objective? This question can be
approached in two ways. One approach relates to the purpose of
thejudiciary. Many tort scholars, including Professors Priest' 98 and
Sugarman, 199 believe that the expansion of tort liability rules over
the last thirty years has in fact been substantially due to a judicial
desire to extend the benefits of loss spreading to larger and larger
circles of accident victims. 20 0 Their position is supported, more-
over, by the rhetoric in certain judicial opinions, mostly in the prod-
ucts liability area.201 Other scholars, however, adhere to the view
that loss-spreading considerations have played no more than a mi-
198 See Priest, supra note 37, at 1534-36.
199 See Sugarman, supra note 2, at 591; see also Fleming, supra note 194, at 1195.
200 A more limited claim would be that juries (and judges), in applying ordinary
rules of tort liability, have resolved doubts liberally in favor of victims so as to take
advantage of the loss-spreading potential of defendants' insurance policies. A more
general claim concerns the purpose of state legislatures in enacting a variety of liability
insurance requirements. For example, victim compensation may well be the purpose of
the legislature in requiring the purchase of auto liability insurance. There are, however,
other possible explanations for compulsory auto insurance. See supra note 68 and ac-
companying text.
201 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,462,150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) ("The cost of an injury... may be an overwhelming
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be in-
sured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business.").
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nor role in recent tort developments. 20 2 They are inclined to down-
play the judicial rhetoric as surplusage or window-dressing,20 3 or at
the least to conclude that the rhetoric is limited to products liability.
This disagreement in assessing judicial purpose is one that I
will agnostically make no effort to resolve here. A second line of
inquiry concerns the suitability of tort law for fulfilling whatever so-
cial policy there may be on behalf of victim compensation. On this
point, a considerable number of scholars-including, but by no
means limited to, Priest20 4 and Sugarman 205 -have identified funda-
mental features of the tort regime that make almost no sense if loss
spreading is accepted as the relevant tort norm.20 6 First of all, even
when tort law's liability rules are liberally defined, those rules reach
only a limited number of accident victims, hence leaving uncompen-
sated large numbers of victims whose losses could quite usefully be
spread.20 7 Furthermore, those victims whose claims tort law does af-
firm receive a measure of compensation that for loss-spreading pur-
poses seems clearly excessive; the loss-spreading concept, for
example, does not justify large awards for pain and suffering, nor
does it condone the double compensation that is called for by tort
law's collateral source rule.20 8 Moreover, the doctrines that tort law
recognizes for purposes of defining eligibility for compensation,
such as negligence and proximate cause, are so expensive to admin-
ister as to render tort law quite awkward as a device for delivering
compensation. In addition, the need to apply those doctrines on a
case-by-case basis inhibits the prompt disposition of tort claims,
which means that tort compensation is subject to delays that a victim
compensation program should not tolerate. Finally, if tort law is
conceived of as something like a compensation program, then the
regressivity entailed in its distribution of wage-loss awards seems
objectionable.
The obvious strength of these criticisms makes it somewhat dif-
202 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 1, at 788-92 (suggesting that "fairness" and "util-
ity" are the actual goals of tort law, and that tort law has never professed to be con-
cerned with, or attempted to solve, the general problem of victim compensation).
203 See Schwartz, supra note 40, at 769 (discussing Prosser's views).
204 See Priest, supra note 37, at 1550-60.
205 See Sugarman, supra note 2, at 592-96. See also Atiyah, supra note 2, at 280-90;
Fleming, supra note 194, at 1203-07.
206 Workers' compensation programs are designed to exclude the tort features that
are described in the text. Those programs are therefore able intelligently to pursue
their undeniable goal of loss spreading.
207 A related point is that the loss-spreading rationale for tort law tends to ignore
the extent to which accident losses are already reimbursed by a variety of non-tort
sources. Data on this point are currently being gathered by the Rand Corporation Insti-
tute for Civil Justice.
208 Also, compensation program policy strongly suggests reimbursement even for
economic losses at something less than an 100% rate.
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ficult for me to adhere to my preferred position of open-mindedness
as to tort law's proper goals. Even so, this position can retain ade-
quate viability by noting several factors. First of all, there remain at
least a few scholars who clearly approve of the idea of tort law pur-
suing the loss-spreading goal.20 9 Second, the criticisms in question
can possibly be deflected by conceding that loss spreading should
not be tort law's primary objective but simply one valid objective
among many that tort law ought to pursue.210 Third, it is notewor-
thy that scholars such as Sugarman and Priest oppose a loss-spread-
ing function for tort law in significant part because they believe that
loss spreading can be better achieved through alternative strategies:
Sugarman, as a liberal, recommends expanded social insurance pro-
grams, 211 while Priest, as a conservative, recommends increased re-
liance on private first-party insurance.212 It is, however, highly
unlikely that current legislatures will implement Sugarman's pro-
posals; and Priest's recommendation ignores the serious problems
of adverse selection and moral hazard that inevitably depress the
private market for disability insurance.2 1 3 For our purposes here,
the relevant point is that once the impractability of alternative loss-
spreading techniques is acknowledged, the analyst might become
somewhat more charitable in reviewing the loss-spreading function
or capacity of tort law.
In any event, what can be said, on balance, is that ifjudges have
relied on the social policy of loss spreading in expanding tort liabil-
ity rules-which is a clear possibility-then liability insurance is an
essential part of the overall judicial enterprise. If, however, it is also
correct that tort law is ill-equipped to achieve that policy, then liabil-
ity insurance is an institution that may have enticed the judiciary
into making an unfortunate mistake.
CONCLUSION
Though in the modern world many tort defendants are self-in-
sured, many other defendants seek the coverage of liability insur-
209 See, e.g., Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity
Strict Liability, 65 N.C.L. REv. 257, 286-93 (1987); see also 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES, & 0.
GRAY, supra note 185, at 149 (loss spreading should be a primary tort objective). Schol-
ars such as Nolan, Ursin, and Gray have yet to respond, however, to the criticisms sum-
marized here.
210 Consider Calabresi's recommendation that "accident law" pursue a variety of
goals, including loss spreading. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 24-33. It is notewor-
thy, however, that in Calabresi's view the tort system fails dismally when measured in
these mixed terms. Id. at 239-308.
211 See Sugarman, supra note 2, at 648-51.
212 See Priest, supra note 37, at 1588-90.
213 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Disability Insurance and Tort Reform (1987 unpub-
lished manuscript).
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ance. This insurance provides an insured with valuable benefits, in
terms of the protection it affords againt a variety of risks: the risk
that his tortious conduct will materialize in an injury; the risk that
the resulting injury will be severe; and the risk that the uncertainties
of the tort system will subject him to unjustified liability (or at least
unjustified defense costs). Ethical and economic criteria each assign
a high ranking to these insurance-related benefits.
Yet a due appreciation of these benefits cannot rule out the
possibility that liability insurance is in conflict with the tort law's ac-
tual objectives. Should there be such a conflict, then either liability
insurance or the tort system should be abandoned or modified.
Most liability insurance is written so as to render its premium some-
what responsive to the level of tortious risktaking engaged in by the
insured. Nevertheless, it is useful to analyze insurance at the ex-
tremes of perfect responsiveness and complete flatness. Flatly
priced insurance is inconsistent with the goal of retributive justice;
however, perfectly responsive insurance enhances the law's ability
to achieve that goal. Liability insurance, regardless of its form, is
highly desirable if compensatory justice is tort law's objective. The
goal of corrective justice, as elaborated by scholars such as Fletcher,
approves of responsive liability insurance but is hostile to liability
insurance to the extent that it is flatly priced. The goal of corrective
justice, as stated more forcefully by a scholar such as Weinrib, seems
antagonistic to all forms of liability insurance. However, moderately
responsive liability insurance satisfies a tort theory that relies on a
combination of compensatory justice and a moderate measure of
corrective justice.
In some number of cases, liability insurance certainly has the
effect of spreading losses. To the (uncertain) extent to which judges
regard loss spreading as an important tort objective, liability insur-
ance performs an essential function. Insofar as it is responsively
priced, liability insurance poses no problem for economically-based
deterrence theories of tort law. Flatly priced liability insurance,
however, raises a real moral-hazard problem: once defendants are
covered by such insurance, they might no longer avoid tortious con-
duct. Taking the prospect of moral hazard into account, Shavell's
First Proof predicts that potential defendants, operating under a
negligence liability rule, will decline to buy such insurance. The
real-world inaccuracy of this prediction underscores, in part, how
very serious and very expensive are the problems caused by the un-
certainties surrounding the negligence standard. In addition, that
prediction's inaccuracy strongly suggests the (partial) error in the
economists' assumption of rational conduct-the assumption that
1990]
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gives rise to the economists' conventional justification of the negli-
gence liability rule.
Shavell's Second Proof, which claims that even flatly priced lia-
bility insurance is economically efficient, is spoiled by the extent to
which tort damage awards do not, ex post, provide victims with full
net compensation for the injuries they have suffered. In truth, the
efficiency of such liability insurance is an uncertain question. Fac-
tors that make it somewhat more likely that this insurance is on bal-
ance efficient include the possibly favorable effect of insurance on
actors' decisions to engage in liability-producing activities, the extra
compensation that insurance affords to victims, and the safety value
of the loss-control services that insurers might provide.
In general, so long as our tort system tolerates (and at times
requires) liability insurance, it is unsound to discuss any objective
that might be imputed to that system without considering both the
incidence of liability insurance and the relationship of that objective
to liability insurance in its various forms. Liability insurance actually
promotes certain possible objectives and is at least consistent with
some others. This insurance, however, is incompatible with further
objectives, especially to the extent that it is flatly priced; and there
are additional objectives that it renders problematic.
This Article has adopted an open-minded attitude as to the
proper goals of tort law in order to expand its coverage by enabling
it to consider how liability insurance relates to a variety of goals that
individual scholars may themselves prefer. I should not end the Ar-
ticle, however, without giving the reader some sense of what my own
judgments are as to proper tort objectives (and accordingly, as to
the role of liability insurance). I will make no effort here to defend
these judgments, except to point out that the Article's previous dis-
cussions of individual objectives include material that gives the
reader some idea as to where myjudgments come from. In my view,
it is inappropriate to invoke either retributive justice or loss spread-
ing as justifications for tort law as we know it. For my purposes,
deterrence is clearly an important tort goal; but here I fall within the
camp of those who believe that tort law, even without insurance, can
be moderately successful-but no more than this-in achieving de-
terrence3 14 Given this assessment, and given, as well, the likeli-
hood of moderately responsive forms of insurance, I am willing to
estimate that most liability insurance policies are efficient. To be
sure, this is only an estimate, and even it concedes the possibility
that insurance is frequently inefficient. Still, this is no more than a
possibility; accordingly, while economics falls short of providing a
214 See supra note 119.
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solid general argument in favor of liability insurance, it does not, in
my view, afford any reason for generally opposing that insurance.
In the meantime, liability insurance seems distinctly fair in the
way it enables parties to protect themselves from the tort system's
various risks-including the distressing risks of defending against
false claims and being subjected to mistaken verdicts. Moreover,
compensatory justice is an objective that I regard as appealing; and
this is an objective that insurance not only complies with but actively
promotes.215 On balance, then, while I support both economic and
ethical approaches to tort law, and while economics dearly plays an
essential role in identifying the attributes and implications of liabil-
ity insurance, I nevertheless find that it is one version of the ethical
approach that is best able to provide liability insurance with a dear
and unequivocal justification. Alternatively stated, our tort system's
commitment to the legality of liability insurance makes me even
more willing to believe that principles of compensatory justice do
provide a major part of the rationale for that system's liability rules.
215 What corrective justice adds to compensatory justice is to my mind helpful but
not indispensable; accordingly, somewhat like Professor Smith, I am willing to accept
whatever degree of corrective justice can be provided by moderately responsive insur-
ance arrangements.
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